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INTRODUCTION 
In order to appreciate the significance of the cases discussed below, 
a brief overview of federal veterans benefits law is beneficial. There are 
three key features of this unique area of law to understand. 
First, veterans benefits law is the creature of a robust federal statutory 
and regulatory scheme. It is unlike any other adjudicatory system. 
Indeed, “the contrast between ordinary civil litigation . . . and the 
system that Congress created for the adjudication of veterans benefits 
claims could hardly be more dramatic.”1 The system is uniquely pro-
claimant.2 Proceedings before the United States Department of 
Veterans Affairs (VA) are informal and nonadversarial.3 
Second, the VA is statutorily obligated to help the veteran by 
developing evidence to support the claim and by giving the veteran the 
benefit of the doubt in deciding the claim.4 The statutory “duty to 
assist” includes providing a medical examination and/or obtaining a 
medical opinion whenever such proof is necessary to make a decision 
on the claim.5 Most significantly, in evaluating the evidence, the VA 
must give the veteran the benefit of the doubt.6 By its very terms, this 
evidentiary standard is far more lenient than other standards, 
including “to a reasonable degree of medical certainty,” “beyond a 
reasonable doubt,” or “by a preponderance of the evidence.” 
Third, the VA struggles with high error rates that lead to substantial 
delays for veterans. Prior to the 2017 Veterans Appeals Improvement 
and Modernization Act (Appeals Modernization Act),7 benefits 
 
 1. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 440 (2011). 
 2. See Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (finding that the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the United States Supreme 
Court “both have long recognized that the character of the veterans’ benefits statutes 
is strongly and uniquely pro-claimant”). 
 3. Id. 
 4. “The VA is charged with the responsibility of assisting veterans in developing 
evidence that supports their claims . . . .” Henderson, 562 U.S. at 440; see 38 U.S.C. 
§ 5103A(a) (2012) (“The Secretary shall make reasonable efforts to assist a claimant 
in obtaining evidence necessary to substantiate the claimant’s claim for a benefit under 
a law administered by the Secretary.”). 
 5. § 5103A(d)(1). 
 6. “When there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence 
regarding any issue material to the determination of a matter, the Secretary shall give 
the benefit of the doubt to the claimant.” § 5107(b); Henderson, 562 U.S. at 440. 
 7. Veteran Appeals Improvement and Modernization Act of 2017, 115 Pub. L. 
No. 115-55, 131 Stat. 1105 (2017). It is too early to know whether this act has 
successfully reduced average length of appeal. 
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appeals took seven years on average, according to the VA’s own 
statistics.8 One in fourteen veterans died while waiting for the 
resolution of his or her appeal.9 Numerous reports by the Office of the 
Inspector General have documented a myriad of problems in the 
system, including the use of incompetent medical examiners for claims 
involving traumatic brain injuries (TBI)—the signature wound of the 
War on Terror;10 lost and missing claims documents;11 and erroneous 
adjudication of military sexual trauma claims.12 
I.    BRIEF BACKGROUND ON THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR           
VETERANS CLAIMS 
Prior to 1988, decision making in the Department of Veterans Affairs 
was a two-tiered administrative system. Decisions rendered by the VA’s 
Board of Veterans Appeals (“the Board” or “Board”) were not subject 
to judicial review. The Federal Circuit described this era in Gardner v. 
Brown13 as one of “splendid isolation,” where Board decisions were free 
from judicial scrutiny.14 
The rationale underlying this freedom from judicial review was 
based on the premise that the VA claims adjudication process should 
remain nonadversarial in nature.15 Congress was concerned that 
adding judicial review to the VA’s decisions (and, by implication, 
attorneys to press veterans’ claims) would add an element of 
antagonism into the system. This fear loomed large in every discussion 
Congress had regarding changes in the system.16 Congressional 
 
 8. Ben Kesling, Hundreds of Thousands of Veterans’ Appeals Dragged out by Huge 
Backlog, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 22, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/hundreds 
-of-thousands-of-veterans-appeals-dragged-out-by-huge-backlog-1534935600 
[https://perma.cc/UZK5-XGCY]. 
 9. Id. 
 10. DEP’T OF VETERAN AFF.: OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., REP. NO. 16-04558-249, VA 
POLICY FOR ADMINISTERING TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY EXAMINATIONS i–ii (2018). 
 11. DEP’T OF VETERAN AFF.: OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., REPORT NO. 18-01214-157, 
HEALTH INFORMATION MANAGEMENT MEDICAL DOCUMENTATION BACKLOG i–ii (2019). 
 12. DEP’T OF VETERAN AFF.: OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., REPORT NO. 17-05248-241, DENIED 
POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER CLAIMS RELATED TO MILITARY SEXUAL TRAUMA i–ii (2018). 
 13. 5 F.3d 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1993), aff’d, 513 U.S. 115 (1994). 
 14. Id. at 1463 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 100-963, pt. 1, at 10 (1988)); see also Brown v. 
Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 122 (1994). 
 15. Stacey-Rae Simcox, Thirty Years of Veterans Law: Welcome to the Wild West, 67 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 513, 517 (2019). 
 16. Id. at 518. 
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conversation on this subject lasted for over thirty-five years.17 Finally, 
the general public’s concerns about the VA’s failing adjudication 
system led to a compromise which allowed for the creation of a federal 
court with the power to review the Board’s decisions.18 
In 1988, President Reagan signed the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act19 
into law, creating the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans 
Claims (CAVC) as an Article I court.20 Currently, the CAVC has a total 
of nine judges, each of whom serve for a fifteen-year term.21 
The CAVC has exclusive jurisdiction to review decisions of the 
Board.22 Specifically, the court may: (1) decide all relevant questions 
of law; (2) interpret constitutional, statutory, and regulatory 
provisions; (3) determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of 
an action of the Secretary of Veterans Affairs (“the Secretary”); (4) 
compel action of the Secretary unlawfully withheld or unreasonably 
delayed; (5) hold unlawful and set aside decisions, findings, 
conclusions, rules and regulations adopted by the Secretary or the 
Board that are arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, 
contrary to constitutional right, or in excess of statutory authority, 
among other things; and (6) hold unlawful and set aside or reverse 
clearly erroneous findings of material fact made by the VA.23 
Limited appellate jurisdiction over CAVC decisions lies in the 
Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction to review 
and decide any challenge to the validity or interpretation of any statute 
or regulation and to interpret constitutional and statutory provisions 
related to veterans’ claims.24 The Federal Circuit also has the authority 
 
 17. Lawrence B. Hagel & Michael P. Horan, Five Years Under the Veterans’ Judicial 
Review Act: The VA Is Brought Kicking and Screaming into the World of Meaningful Due 
Process, 46 ME. L. REV. 43, 44 (1994). 
 18. S. REP. NO. 100-418, at 30–31 (1988) (opening statement of Chairman Alan 
Cranston, Senate Committee on Veterans’ Affairs). 
 19. Veterans’ Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, § 301, 102 Stat. 4105 (1988). 
 20. Id. The CAVC was previously referred to as the Court of Veterans Appeals. See 
generally Simcox, supra note 15, at 513–14. 
 21. 38 U.S.C. § 7253(a)–(c), (h)(5)(i)(1) (2012). 
 22. § 7252(a). 
 23. § 7261(a). The “clearly erroneous” standard differs slightly from the 
Administrative Procedures Act’s “arbitrary and capricious” standard applied to 
questions of fact. Marsh v. Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989) (referring 
to 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988)). 
 24. 38 U.S.C. § 7261(c). 
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to set aside regulations and interpretations which are arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise unlawful.25 
However, the Federal Circuit cannot review challenges to a factual 
determination or to a law or regulation as applied to the facts of a particular 
case, unless it presents a constitutional issue.26 The Federal Circuit does have 
the authority to affirm, modify, remand, or reverse a decision of the CAVC.27 
The Federal Circuit does not often make decisions in the area of 
veterans law. However, when it does, the decision often impacts 
hundreds of thousands of veterans. The Federal Circuit’s decisions can 
overturn decades of case law in one fell swoop. 
II.    AUER DEFERENCE SURVIVES 
Since the 2010 term, only one veterans law case, Kisor v. Wilkie,28 has 
been decided by the Supreme Court of the United States. In Kisor, the 
question presented to the Court was whether it should overrule Auer v. 
Robbins29 and Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.30 The Court did not 
overrule Auer or Seminole Rock;31 instead it developed a more thorough 
test to help courts review agency interpretation of the agency’s own 
regulations.32 In her opinion, Justice Kagan acknowledged that, in the 
past, the Supreme Court sent mixed messages regarding Auer 
deference and clarification and guidance was in order.33 
Before discussing the details of the Kisor opinion, Section II.A of this 
Article will explain the history of Auer and Seminole Rock deference. 
Then, Section II.B will discuss Kisor’s framework for future cases 
involving issues relating to agency regulations. 
A.   The History of Auer Deference 
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co. preceded the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.34 
by approximately four decades but did not offer any specific explanation 
 
 25. Id. § 7261(d). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. § 7261(b). 
 28. No. 18-15, slip op. 1, 28–29 (2019). 
 29. 519 U.S. 452 (1997). 
 30. 325 U.S. 410 (1945). 
 31. Kisor, slip op. at 29. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
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for the circumstances requiring deference to an agency’s 
interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation.35 In the most common 
explanation of the Seminole Rock standard, an agency interpretation of 
its own regulation is controlling unless its reading is plainly erroneous 
or inconsistent with the regulation.36 
In 1997, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Court’s view of Seminole 
Rock in Auer. In Auer, the petitioners were sergeants and lieutenants of 
the St. Louis police force who were seeking payment for overtime pay 
under the Federal Labor Standards Act.37 The St. Louis Board of Police 
Commissioners argued that the petitioners were not entitled to 
overtime pay because they fell under the “bona fide executive, 
administrative, or professional” employee exemption in the federal 
statute.38 Under the Department of Labor’s regulations, exempt status 
is also measured by whether the employee is paid on a salary-basis.39 
The officers argued they were not truly salaried employees, because 
their income could be reduced based on disciplinary infractions.40 
The Secretary of Labor, in an amicus curiae brief, interpreted the 
salary-basis test articulated in the regulation to deny exempt status 
where employees are covered by a policy that permits disciplinary or 
deductions in pay as a practical matter.41 The Secretary of Labor 
explained that if an actual practice or an employment policy created a 
significant likelihood of a pay cut, the exemption would not apply.42 The 
Court, with Justice Scalia writing, found that because this test is a creature 
of the Secretary of Labor’s own regulations, its interpretation is controlling 
unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.43 
Since Auer, courts have followed Justice Scalia’s roadmap with regard 
to agency interpretation of its own regulations.44 Specifically, courts 
will defer to the agency’s interpretation of its own ambiguous 
regulation, unless the interpretation is clearly erroneous.45 However, 
since 2011, the Supreme Court has signaled increasing skepticism 
 
 35. Id.; see also Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 414. 
 36. Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 414. 
 37. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997). 
 38. Id. at 455 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1)(1994)). 
 39. Id. at 461. 
 40. Id. at 462. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 461. 
 45. Id. 
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about the future of Auer.46 Kisor created the perfect storm for the Court 
to reconsider the two-decade Auer precedent. 
B.   Kisor Fails to Overturn Auer 
The Supreme Court’s most recent foray into reexamining Auer arose 
in the context of a veteran’s claim for disability compensation. In Kisor, 
the Court was presented with the Secretary of the VA’s interpretation 
of an ambiguous regulation, 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c)(1), and the meaning 
of the word “relevant” in the context of the case.47 The regulation 
provides, “at any time after VA issues a decision on a claim, if VA 
receives or associates with the claims file relevant official service 
department records that existed and had not been associated with the 
claims file when VA first decided the claim, VA will reconsider the 
claim . . . .”48 Significantly, the regulation allows for the effective date 
of the award of the benefits to date back to the submission of the 
original claim if relevant official service department records are 
associated with the file.49 
The claimant, James Kisor, originally filed a claim for benefits in 
1982 for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).50 At that time, the VA 
denied his claim because he lacked a diagnosis.51 In 2006, Mr. Kisor 
reapplied and presented two new service records and a current 
diagnosis.52 The VA granted the claim but established the effective date 
for payment as 2006, not 1982.53 Mr. Kisor argued that the effective 
date should be 1982, not 2006, because the records existed and were 
 
 46. See Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 617 (2013) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“Two terms ago, in my separate concurrence in Talk America, I expressed 
doubts about the validity of [Auer]. In that case, however, the agency’s interpretation 
of the rule was also the fairest one, and no party had asked us to reconsider Auer. 
Today, however, the Court’s deference to the Agency makes the difference (note the 
Court’s defensive insistence that the Agency’s interpretation need not be ‘the best 
one’). And respondent has asked us, if necessary, to ‘reconsider Auer.’ I believe that it 
is time to do so.”) (citation omitted); Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 
U.S. 142, 158–59 (2012); Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 69 (2011) 
(Scalia, J., concurring). 
 47. Kisor v. Wilkie, No. 18-15, slip op. 1, 2 (2019). 
 48. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c)(1) (2019) (emphasis added). 
 49. Id. § 3.156(c)(3). The effective date of a claim may bear significantly on the value 
of the claim and result in a substantial discrepancy in benefits awarded upon review. 
 50. Kisor, slip op. at 2. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
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not associated with his claim file at the VA. Mr. Kisor’s reading of the 
regulation required the earlier effective date. Reviewing his argument, 
the Board found that the later associated service records were not 
“relevant” because they did not relate to the reason for the 1982 
denial.54 Here, the agency’s interpretation of the regulation came 
directly from the Board’s decision.55 
At the Federal Circuit, the court determined Auer deference applied 
to the Agency’s interpretation.56 Specifically, the Federal Circuit found 
that the term “relevant” was ambiguous and determined that the 
Board’s interpretation was not plainly erroneous or inconsistent.57 Mr. 
Kisor appealed to the Supreme Court.58 
At the Supreme Court, Mr. Kisor argued that Auer deference is a 
violation of the separation of powers clause in the U.S. Constitution 
because the governmental branch that makes the laws should not be 
the one to also interpret the laws it makes.59 Mr. Kisor argued that if 
deference to interpretation should be allowed, it should be based upon 
a more formal manner of conveying a definition of the terms.60 
According to Mr. Kisor, only those definitions which result from 
Administrative Procedures Act61 (APA) notice and comment 
procedures should be accepted by a court.62 
The Solicitor General, perhaps sensing that the Court was 
considering reviewing Auer, argued that Seminole Rock and Auer raise 
significant concerns under the APA and lack clear historical 
precedent.63 The government urged the Court to impose limits on 
agency deference to force agencies to commit to better rule making, 
stopping short of requesting the court to overrule Seminole Rock and 
Auer completely. Overruling these cases would open the floodgates, as 
thousands of cases relying on these precedents may have to be litigated 
again.64 The government also argued that agency interpretation of its 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Kisor v. Shulkin, 869 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2017), vacated and remanded, 
Kisor slip op. at 2424. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Kisor, slip op. at 3. 
 59. Id. at 19. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 22. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Brief of Respondent at 14, Kisor v. Wilkie, No 18-15 (2019). 
 64. Id. 
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own regulation should only be considered when the interpretation 
represents the view of the agency as a whole and not the view of a single 
employee such as the Veterans Law Judge in Mr. Kisor’s case.65 
In Kisor, the Supreme Court ultimately decided to uphold Auer 
deference66 However, Kisor provides needed guidance for courts 
presented with the important issues arising from agency interpretation 
of its own regulations. Justice Kagan, writing for the Court, outlines a 
three-step test.67 First, the court must determine whether there is genuine 
ambiguity in the regulatory language.68 Second, if ambiguity exists, the 
interpretation of the regulation must be a reasonable interpretation.69 
Third, even if the interpretation is reasonable, the court must determine 
whether that interpretation is entitled to controlling weight.70 
With regard to the first step, the Supreme Court instructs lower 
courts to exhaust all traditional rules of construction to determine 
whether regulatory language is genuinely ambiguous.71 Although the 
Court did not exhaustively describe these traditional tools, most courts 
look to the natural reading or ordinary understanding of the disputed 
word.72 Additionally, courts will look to the statutory context in which 
the term is used and the original intent of the drafter or agency.73 
If no ambiguity exists, a court should apply the plain meaning of the 
word or phrase that is in dispute.74 Thus, courts do not have to give 
deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations if the 
regulation is unambiguous.75 
With regard to the second Kisor step, if a court finds a genuine 
ambiguity in the regulatory language, a court must determine whether 
the agency interpretation is reasonable.76 This framework is 
 
 65. Id. at 12, 27, 46. 
 66. Kisor, slip op. at 29. 
 67. Id. at 13–15. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See VALERIE BRANNON & JARED COLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44954, CHEVRON 
DEFERENCE: A PRIMER 17 (2017) (describing judges’ methods of determining the 
“natural reading” or “ordinary understanding” of the word at issue, including 
reference to dictionaries). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Kisor, slip op. at 14. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
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reminiscent of the Chevron analysis.77 If the interpretation is 
unreasonable, a court does not need to give deference to the agency’s 
interpretation.78 However, even if the interpretation is reasonable, a 
court must still move to step three.79 This final step is the biggest shift 
from the traditional Auer deference. 
The third and final step requires a court to determine whether the 
agency’s interpretation is entitled to controlling weight.80 There are 
several factors a court should consider on this point, including whether 
the interpretation is the agency’s official position, implicates the 
agency’s substantive expertise, and shows fair and considered 
judgment.81 Unlike Auer, Kisor allows the court to review the agency’s 
process in creating its guidance and determine whether deference is 
proper in that context.82 
In light of the newly articulated test, the Supreme Court remanded 
Kisor. On remand, the Federal Circuit must first determine whether 
ambiguity actually exists as to the term “relevant.”83 If no ambiguity exists, 
the analysis stops and the plain meaning would apply.84 If the term 
“relevant” is ambiguous, the Federal Circuit must determine whether the 
VA Secretary’s interpretation is reasonable.85 If unreasonable, the analysis 
would stop and no deference would be afforded to the VA Secretary.86 
However, if the Federal Circuit finds the interpretation reasonable, it 
must analyze whether Congress would want the interpretation by the 
Board of Veterans Appeals to be given deference as the agency’s 
decision on the proper interpretation.87 In this regard, the Court 
pointed out that the Board consists of 100 veteran law judges who 
individually review cases.88 Further, the Court discussed that Board 
decisions are of nonprecedential value.89 Given these facts, the 
Supreme Court directed the Federal Circuit to determine whether the 
 
 77. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
 78. Kisor, slip op. at 14. 
 79. Id. at 15. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 15–17. 
 83. Id. at 13. 
 84. Id. at 14. 
 85. Id. at 15. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
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interpretation of regulatory language by this level of agency personnel 
should be accorded deference under the new Kisor test.90 
Looking forward, Kisor deference will likely lead to more robust 
criticism and legal challenges to agencies and their interpretations of 
their own regulations. Kisor will require courts to analyze how the 
agency reached its interpretation, not simply rely on the agency’s 
interpretation however made. 
III.    FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S REVIEW OF VA’S INTERNAL MANUAL, M21-1 
In 2016, Disabled American Veterans (DAV) petitioned the Federal 
Circuit to review a provision of the VA Adjudication Procedures Manual 
M21-1 (“the M21”).91 As detailed below, the M21 is the VA’s internal 
manual, used by adjudicators and cited by the Board on occasion. 
DAV’s challenge arose from federal law that provides a presumption 
for Persian Gulf veterans with a medically unexplained chronic 
multisymptom illness (“MUCMI”).92 The VA regulations implementing 
this law define a MUCMI as “a diagnosed illness without conclusive 
pathophysiology or etiology.”93 However, in 2015, the VA changed the M21 
to require both an inconclusive pathophysiology and an inconclusive 
etiology to meet the definition of a MUCMI.94 Further, the amended 
M21 added an example that provided that sleep apnea could not be a 
MUCMI.95 Although many advocates agreed that the M21 
misinterpreted the regulation, the Federal Circuit found that it did not 
have jurisdiction to review the VA’s internal manual.96 
In a separate case, Gray v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs,97 the veteran 
petitioned the Federal Circuit to review a provision of the M21 related 
to Agent Orange.98 Congress enacted statutes providing for 
presumptive service connection for veterans who served in the 
Republic of Vietnam during the Vietnam era and suffered from a 
disease on the list of illnesses determined to be related to Agent 
 
 90. Id. 
 91. Disabled Am. Veterans v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 859 F.3d 1072, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 92. 38 U.S.C. § 1117 (2012). 
 93. 38 C.F.R. § 3.317(a)(2)(ii) (2017). 
 94. Disabled Am. Veterans, 859 F.3d at 1074. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. 875 F.3d 1102, 1104 (Fed. Cir. 2017), vacated, 774 F. App’x 678 (2019). 
 98. Id. 
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Orange exposure.99 In 2016, the VA updated the M21 to also exclude 
veterans who served in bays, harbors, and ports of Vietnam.100 Again, 
because the new interpretation is located in the VA’s internal manual, 
the M21, the Federal Circuit found that it did not have jurisdiction to 
review these policies.101 
Before discussing the Federal Circuit’s conclusion that it lacked 
jurisdiction to review the VA’s internal manual, Section III.A. of this 
Article below will discuss in further detail the M21 and its use in the 
VA’s system. Section III.B. will discuss prior Federal Circuit 
jurisprudence relating to the judicial review of agency action. Finally, 
Section III.C. will focus on the Court’s finding in Gray and its impact 
on veterans law in the future. 
A.   The M21-1 Manual 
The VA consolidates and explains its policies and procedures in an 
internal manual, the M21.102 The M21 is not published in the Federal 
Register or the Code of Federal Regulations.103 The VA explains, the 
M21 is issued by the Chief Benefits Director and its provisions are 
intended to provide uniform procedures for adjudication of claims.104 
The M21 specifically provides guidance for Veterans Benefits 
Administration (VBA) employees, who adjudicate claims and appeals.105 
The VA has explicitly concluded that the M21 does not constitute the 
instructions of the Secretary, and its provisions are not binding on the 
Board.106 Further, the M21 is currently in electronic form and is 
amended on a regular basis.107 As of November 20, 2019, the VA 
changed the M21 365 times in 2019 alone.108 
 
 99. 38 U.S.C. § 1116(a) (2012). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Gray, 875 F.3d at 1104. 
 102. Disabled Am. Veterans v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 859 F.3d 1072, 1074 (Fed. 
Cir. 2017). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Vet. Aff. Op. Gen. Couns. Prec. 7-92 (1992) (internal quotations omitted). 
 105. Disabled Am. Veterans, 859 F.3d at 1074. 
 106. Id. at 1077. 
 107. M21-1 Changes by Date, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF., https://www.knowva. 
ebenefits.va.gov/system/templates/selfservice/va_ssnew/help/customer/locale/en-
US/portal/554400000001018/content/554400000100821/ Changes%20by%20Date 
[https://perma.cc/BZA3-Z8VE]. 
 108. Id. 
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In the M21, the VA outlines the various steps that an adjudicator 
must take in each case.109 For example, the M21 reviews how to classify 
mail and what type of action should be taken when a piece of mail is 
received, including prioritizing mail from Congress, action mail that 
requires the VA to respond, and filing mail that does not necessitate a 
response.110 However, Disabled American Veterans and Gray illustrate 
situations in which the M21 is more than just a procedural manual and 
negatively impacts a veteran’s rights under federal law. 
B.   The Federal Circuit’s Authority to Review the VA’s Actions 
Under the APA, rules promulgated by an agency can be challenged.111 
The APA requires agencies to publish certain rules in advance of their 
effective date so that stakeholders can provide input on the 
regulations.112 However, the APA does not apply to rules of procedure, 
statements of general policy, and interpretations of general 
applicability.113 Specifically, an interpretative rule is exempt from notice 
and comment rulemaking.114 An interpretative rule simply indicates an 
agency’s reading of a statute or a rule and does not create new rights 
or remedies.115 As a result, the APA notice and comment provisions do 
not apply if the policy is labeled “interpretive.” 
Under 38 U.S.C. § 502, an action by the Secretary of the U.S. 
Department of Veterans Affairs under § 552(a)(1) or § 553 of title 5 is 
subject to judicial review directly to the Federal Circuit, bypassing the 
CAVC.116 Section 552(a)(1) requires that all substantive rules of 
general applicability and statements of general policy or interpretation 
of general applicability must be published in the Federal Register.117 
 
 109. See generally M2–1 Adjudication Procedures Manual, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF., 
https://www.knowva.ebenefits.va.gov/system/templates/selfservice/va_ssnew/help/
customer/locale/en-US/portal/554400000001018/content/554400000073398/M21-
1,%20Adjudication%20Procedures%20Manual,%20Table%20of%20Content 
[https://perma.cc/648M-XH6M]. 
 110. M21-1 III.ii.1.B.2.a, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF., https://www.knowva 
.ebenefits.va.gov/system/templates/selfservice/va_ssnew/help/customer/locale/en-
US/portal/554400000001018/content/554400000014111/M21-1,-Part-III,-Subpart-
ii,-Chapter-1,-Section-B---Mail-Management [https://perma.cc/5ZA6-2Y54]. 
 111. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012). 
 112. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. West, 138 F.3d 1434, 1435 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Splane v. West, 216 F.3d 1058, 1064 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 115. Id. at 1063. 
 116. 38 U.S.C. § 502. 
 117. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D). 
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Section 553 refers to agency rulemaking that must comply with notice 
and comment procedures.118 
Previously, the Federal Circuit reviewed a challenge to a Veterans 
Health Administration directive because the directive was not 
published for notice and comment in the Federal Register before 
adoption, as required under § 553.119 Reviewing the directive under 
§ 552(a)(1), the Federal Circuit explained that § 552(a)(1) does not 
only require publication of substantive rules but also statements of 
general policy and interpretations of general applicability.120 However, 
rules created under § 552(a)(2) are exempt from judicial review under 
38 U.S.C. § 502 because they are not published in the Federal 
Register.121 Under § 552(a)(2), the statute allows agencies to publish 
rules available for public inspection in electronic format, including 
statements of policy and interpretation that have been adopted by the 
agency but are not published in the Federal Register.122 Additionally, 
administrative staff manuals and instructions to staff that affect a 
member of the public are also not reviewable under § 502.123 
Due to § 502’s limiting jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit can only 
review those matters that are published in the Federal Register or rules 
subject to notice and comment under § 553, unless the agency action 
has the force of law.124 Several times in the past few years, the Federal 
Circuit has addressed whether the provisions found in the M21 rise to 
the level of a rule, reviewable under its jurisdiction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 118. § 553. 
 119. Preminger v. Sec’y of Veterans Aff., 632 F.3d 1345, 1347–49 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(per curiam). 
 120. Id. at 1348–49. 
 121. 38 U.S.C. § 502. 
 122. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2). 
 123. 38 U.S.C. § 502. 
 124. Disabled Am. Veterans v. Sec’y of Veterans Aff., 859 F.3d 1072, 1077–78 (Fed. 
Cir. 2017). 
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C.   Disabled American Veterans’ Lasting Impact on the Future of 
Veterans Law 
A million claims for benefits are filed every year with the VA.125 Of 
the claims filed, only four to five percent are appealed to the Board.126 
The M21 is essentially binding on at least ninety-five percent of claims 
filed by veterans, since those veterans do not appeal to the Board.127 
What makes this reality even more concerning is the Regional Office’s 
rate of error.128 The Board overturns the Regional Office’s decision 
74.56% of the time, by either granting the claim outright or remanding 
the case back to the Regional Office, because the Regional Office 
failed to comply with its duties.129 
In Disabled American Veterans and Gray, the Federal Circuit explained 
that because the M21 provisions are not binding on the Board, the 
provisions do not have the force of law.130 The VA does not treat M21 
provisions like regulations, and as a result, they are not published for 
notice and comment. Thus, when the VA determines an interpretation of 
a regulation, such as what the term “in the Republic of Vietnam” means, 
and chooses to place that interpretation in the M21, the VA effectively 
evades judicial review under the holding in Disabled American Veterans. While 
the Gray certiorari petition was pending in the Supreme Court, the Federal 
Circuit decided Procopio v. Wilkie,131 discussed below, mooting Gray.132 
Due to Disabled American Veterans and Gray’s precedent, there is 
currently no judicial review available to address incorrect or 
inadequate guidance in the M21.133 Therefore, for each claim that is 
filed with the Regional Office, the adjudicator is required to follow the 
 
 125. Cf. Veterans Benefits Administration Process One Millionth Claim in FY 2014, U.S. 
DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF.: OFF. OF PUB. & INTERGOVERNMENTAL AFF., (July 14, 2014, 8:00 
AM), https://www.va.gov/opa/pressrel/pressrelease.cfm?id=2582 [https://perma.cc 
/ZAA9-A663] (announcing the VA’s projected processed claims as totaling 1.3 million 
for Fiscal Year 2014, an increase of 200,000 over Fiscal Year 2013). 
 126. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF., DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS (VA) STRATEGIC 
PLAN TO TRANSFORM THE APPEAL PROCESS 11. 
 127. Id. 
 128. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF. (VA) BOARD OF VETERANS’ APPEALS, ANNUAL REPORT 
FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2018, at 31–33 (2019). 
 129. Id. at 31. 
 130. Disabled Am. Veterans v. Sec’y of Veterans Aff., 859 F.3d 1072, 1077 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 131. 913 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 132. Gray v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2764, 2764 (2019) (vacating and remanding Federal 
Circuit Decision as moot). 
 133. Disabled Am. Veterans, 859 F.3d at 1072. 
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M21, which may be inconsistent with the law.134 As discussed above, 
many of these claims are on appeal for five to seven years before 
reaching the Board which is the first adjudicative level not bound by 
the M21’s guidance. In the future, a significant risk remains that the 
VA will implement rules in the M21 that are inconsistent with statutes 
and regulations, just as it did in Gray. Until reversed, Disabled American 
Veterans and Gray allow the agency to forego drafting regulations and 
simply add interpretive language into the M21, without the concern of 
judicial review. This situation is unfortunate, given the special 
solicitude imbued in federal veterans benefits law.135 
IV.    SIGNIFICANT SUBSTANTIVE LAW CHANGES FOR VIETNAM VETERANS 
Recently, the Federal Circuit has decided significant cases that have 
overturned decades of case law, impacting hundreds of thousands of 
veterans. Two powerful examples of these changes are found in the 
court’s decisions in Procopio v. Wilkie and Saunders v. Wilkie136 discussed 
more fully below. 
A.   Blue Water Vietnam Veterans—Procopio v. Wilkie 
In 1979, several Vietnam veterans and their families joined in a class 
action suit against the makers of the herbicide referred to as “Agent 
Orange.”137 Agent Orange was sprayed during the Vietnam War in 
Vietnam and in other areas in order to clear the jungle of foliage, 
improving visibility for American troops fighting the enemy.138 The 
veterans involved in the Agent Orange litigation asserted exposure to 
Agent Orange caused harmful conditions and diseases.139 In 1984, the 
veterans and manufacturers settled the claims for $180 million dollars.140 
In 1991, partially in response to the plight of Vietnam veterans and 
partially in response to the possibility of a prolonged conflict in the 
Middle East, Congress passed a statute that presumed veterans who 
served “in the Republic of Vietnam” were exposed to Agent Orange.141 
 
 134. Id. at 1078. 
 135. See Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 440 (2011). 
 136. 886 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 137. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 746 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), 
aff’d, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 138. Id. at 775–76. 
 139. Id. at 764–75. 
 140. Id. at 863. 
 141. See 38 U.S.C. § 1116 (2012); 102 CONG. REC. 2360–61 (1991). 
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Two years later, the VA finalized regulations to implement the statute. 
In these regulations, the VA interpreted “in the Republic of Vietnam” 
to include service “in the waters offshore” of Vietnam and service 
requiring duty or visitation on land in the Republic of Vietnam.142 Because 
the VA later believed that the regulation’s phrase “waters offshore” was 
ambiguous, a 1997 VA General Counsel opinion interpreted “waters 
offshore” to include only the inland waterways of Vietnam.143 
While receiving presumptive exposure to Agent Orange was 
relatively simple for Vietnam veterans who had stepped foot on the 
landmass of Vietnam (described as “boots on the ground” by VA advocates) 
this was not the case for veterans who had served on ships in the territorial 
waters of Vietnam.144 These veterans were referred to as “Blue Water” 
veterans in the open ocean, as opposed to the “Brown Water” veterans who 
served on the inland waterways of Vietnam in shallower waters.145 
In 2006, the CAVC issued a decision in the case of a Blue Water Navy 
veteran, Jonathan Haas. In this case, the CAVC used the two-step test 
found in the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc.146: 
First . . . is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the 
precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the 
end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give 
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, 
however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed 
the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its 
own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the 
absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is 
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question 
for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute.147 
Applying Chevron, the CAVC considered § 1116 and found the 
phrase “in the Republic of Vietnam” ambiguous.148 Because the court 
 
 142. 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(6) (1993). 
 143. Procopio v. Wilkie, 913 F.3d 1371, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citing Gen. Counsel 
Prec. 27-97 (July 23, 1997); 62 Fed. Reg. 63,603, 63,604 (Dec. 1, 1997)). 
 144. See, e.g., Gray v. McDonald, 27 Vet. App. 313, 316–17 (2015). 
 145. Id. at 317. 
 146. Recall that the Chevron analysis was utilized before Kisor’s recalibration of Auer 
and Standing Rock deference. See infra Section I.B. 
 147. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 
(1984) (internal footnotes omitted). 
 148. Haas v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 257, 269 (2006), rev’d sub nom, Haas v. Peake, 
525 F.3d 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
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found the statute ambiguous, it then turned to step two of the Chevron 
test to determine if the VA’s interpretation of the phrase was reasonable 
and entitled to deference.149 The CAVC found that the regulation “merely 
has replaced statutory ambiguity with regulatory ambiguity” and reviewed 
the VA’s interpretation of its regulation’s meaning through the lens of Auer 
deference.150 In this review, the CAVC held that the VA’s interpretation of 
the regulatory phrase “waters offshore” was “plainly erroneous” and could 
be afforded no deference.151 
In 2008, the Federal Circuit heard the Secretary of Veterans Affairs’ 
appeal of the CAVC’s decision and decided Haas v. Peake.152 The panel 
decision, written by Judge Bryson, also applied the two-step test153 
created by the Supreme Court in Chevron to determine whether or not 
the VA’s interpretation was entitled to deference. The Federal Circuit 
agreed with the CAVC that “[t]here are many ways in which to 
interpret the boundaries of a sovereign nation such as the former 
Republic of Vietnam” to include only the landmass, or a nation’s 
“economic zone.”154 While the government supported the position that 
§ 1116 was ambiguous concerning the meaning of “in the Republic of 
Vietnam,” Mr. Haas argued that the phrase “in the Republic of 
Vietnam” was clearly intended to include the “territorial waters off of 
the landmass of Vietnam.”155 Mr. Haas pointed to two official 
references, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea, which defined “Republic of Vietnam” to include the twelve 
nautical miles off the shore of Vietnam.156 The court discussed the fact 
that there were other definitions of “Republic of Vietnam” that did not 
include the territorial waters off of the shore and that the legislative 
history of the statute was unclear concerning the territorial waters.157 
The court noted, “Congress did not indicate that service ‘in’ the 
Republic of Vietnam included service on the waters offshore or in any 
other location nearby.”158 
 
 149. Id. at 269–70. 
 150. Id. at 269–71. 
 151. Id. at 269–70. 
 152. 525 F.3d 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 153. Id. at 1186. 
 154. Id. at 1184 (citing Haas, 20 Vet. App. at 263). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 1184–85. 
 158. Id. at 1185. 
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Mr. Haas also argued the legislative history behind § 1116 indicated 
Congress’s clear intent to include presumptive service connection to 
veterans who served in the offshore waters. The court disagreed with 
this analysis of the legislative history.159 However, in light of the various 
definitions of “in the Republic of Vietnam” that could be applicable, 
the Federal Circuit agreed with the CAVC that the phrase “in the 
Republic of Vietnam” was ambiguous.160 
Having determined § 1116 was ambiguous, the Federal Circuit 
turned to step two of the Chevron test. The Court analyzed whether the 
VA’s interpretation of “in the Republic of Vietnam” to include only the 
inland waterways of Vietnam was reasonable.161 In order to answer this 
question, the court reviewed the VA’s interpretation of its own 
regulations implementing § 1116. Specifically, the court looked at the 
1993 formally adopted VA regulation interpreting “in the Republic of 
Vietnam” to mean “waters offshore” and the General Counsel’s 1997 
opinion defining “waters offshore” to include only the “inland 
waterways of Vietnam.”162 The court began this review with a 
consideration of Auer deference: that “an agency’s interpretation of its 
own regulations is controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent 
with the regulations being interpreted” and that “substantial 
deference” must be granted.163 
The Federal Circuit acknowledged the concerns of the CAVC, which 
had determined that the VA’s interpretation of its regulation was 
“plainly erroneous,”164 and found that these concerns were not 
significant enough to overcome Auer deference. Specifically, the CAVC 
expressed concern that the VA’s interpretation and application of the 
regulation was not consistent.165 The Federal Circuit agreed but found 
that occasional inconsistency did not strip the agency of the deference 
it was due under Auer.166 The CAVC also articulated a concern that the 
VA’s interpretation of its regulation was riddled with flawed reasoning 
 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 1186. 
 161. Id. at 1186. 
 162. Id. at 1180–82, 1186. 
 163. Id. at 1186 (citing Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 165 
(2007) (internal quotations omitted); see also Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461–63 
(1997); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (quoting 
Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 430 (1988)). 
 164. Haas, 525 F.3d at 1174. 
 165. Id. at 1187. 
 166. Id. 
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leading to a “plainly erroneous” conclusion.167 The Federal Circuit 
disagreed with this concern as well, stating that the court saw nothing 
about the General Counsel’s opinion that “renders that 
interpretation . . . plainly erroneous.”168 With regard to the CAVC’s 
concern that the VA’s interpretation of its regulation was not the 
product of “valid or thorough reasoning,”169 because of the lack of 
scientific evidence supporting the “arbitrariness of the line-drawing 
done by the agency,” the Federal Circuit remained unpersuaded.170 
After a quick overview of only some of the scientific evidence available, 
the Federal Circuit determined that the CAVC’s focus on the facts of Mr. 
Haas’ case specifically had no bearing on a reasonable interpretation of 
the meaning of the regulation as a whole.171 The Federal Circuit 
contrasted the CAVC’s reasoning to the VA’s own interpretation which 
the court considered a “plausible construction of the statutory 
language . . . it is based on a simple but undisputed fact—that spraying 
was done on land, not over the water.”172 
From 2008 to 2019, the Haas case prevented Blue Water veterans from 
benefitting from the Agent Orange presumptions and receiving VA 
benefits for diseases caused by the herbicide. The landscape for the 
surviving Blue Water Navy veterans changed dramatically when the Federal 
Circuit overruled Haas in its 2019 en banc decision in Procopio v. Wilkie.173 
Appellant, Alfred Procopio was a Navy veteran who served aboard 
the U.S.S. Intrepid in the open waters near Vietnam in the 1960s.174 
Mr. Procopio filed a claim with the VA for diabetes and prostate 
cancer, two conditions on the Agent Orange list.175 The VA denied his 
claims in 2009.176 The CAVC, in a single judge opinion, cited Haas and 
 
 167. Id. at 1191. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 1193. 
 171. Id. at 1194–95. 
 172. Id. at 1195. But see id. at 1197 (Fogel, J., dissenting) (agreeing that the statute 
itself was ambiguous but finding the VA’s interpretation unreasonable). 
 173. 913 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 174. Id. at 1374. 
 175. Id. at 1371; see also U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, DISEASES ASSOCIATED WITH 
AGENT ORANGE, https://www.publichealth.va.gov/exposures/publications/agent-
orange/agent-orange-summer-2015/agent-orange-presumptives.asp 
[https://perma.cc/L25P-T9YE]. 
 176. Procopio, 913 F.3d at 1374. 
1364 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:1343 
 
found that a presumptive service-connection for Mr. Procopio was not 
possible because he served in the territorial waters of Vietnam.177 
Mr. Procopio appealed the case to the Federal Circuit and after two 
oral arguments in 2018 before a panel of judges the court ordered an 
en banc hearing.178 The court also ordered further briefing and 
argument to specifically address two questions. First, “[d]oes the 
phrase ‘served in the Republic of Vietnam’ . . . unambiguously include 
service in offshore waters . . . ?” Second, “[w]hat role, if any, does the 
pro-claimant canon play in this analysis?”179 Mr. Procopio’s supporters 
filed fourteen amicus briefs to further aid him in his efforts.180 
In its January 2019 decision, the Federal Circuit, stopping at step-
one of the Chevron analysis, found that “the Haas court went astray when 
it found ambiguity in § 1116 based on ‘competing methods of defining the 
reaches of a sovereign nation.’”181 In coming to its conclusion, the court 
conducted an overview of international law, beginning with Article 4 in the 
1955 Geneva Convention which extended the military line of demarcation 
for the Republic of Vietnam into the territorial waters.182 The court also 
considered the 1958 United Nations Convention on the Territorial Sea and 
the Contiguous Zone, which proposed that a country’s sovereignty extends 
beyond inland waters and into the territorial seas.183 Additionally, the court 
cited the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, a 
convention considered and dismissed by the Haas court,184 which 
recognized the territorial waters “having a breadth ‘not exceeding [twelve] 
nautical miles.’”185 Because Congress ratified the convention that 
extended the sovereignty of a nation beyond its landmass and into the 
waters up to twelve nautical miles from shore, the court found that 
Congress’s use of the term “in the Republic of Vietnam” was carefully 
chosen and unambiguous186: 
 
 177. Procopio v. McDonald, No. 15–4082, 2016 WL 6816244, at *5 (Vet. App. Nov. 18, 
2016), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Procopio v. Wilkie, 913 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 178. Procopio, 913 F.3d at 1374. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 1372–73. 
 181. Id. at 1380. 
 182. Id. at 1375. 
 183. Id. (citing Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, art. 
1(1), Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639). 
 184. Id. at 1375–76; see also Haas v. Peake, 525 F.3d 1168, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 2008), 
overruled by Procopio v. Wilkie, 913 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 185. Procopio, 913 F.3d at 1375–76. 
 186. Id. at 1376. 
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Congress chose to use the formal name of the country and invoke a 
notion of territorial boundaries by stating that “service in the 
Republic of Vietnam” is included. The intent of Congress is clear 
from its use of the term “in the Republic of Vietnam,” which all 
available international law unambiguously confirms includes its 
territorial sea. Because we must “give effect to the unambiguously 
expressed intent of Congress,” we do not reach Chevron step two.187 
The Federal Circuit commented that because it had found that 
congressional statutes were designed with a pro-veteran purpose, the 
court did not need to reach a decision on whether the pro-veteran canon 
of statutory interpretation referred to in Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. 
Shinseki188 and Brown v. Gardner189 should be applied.190 
Judge Lourie filed a concurrence, agreeing with the result but finding 
§ 1116 was ambiguous, and explaining his view that the regulation 
interpreting the statute was unreasonable because “waters offshore” meant 
exactly that.191 Because Mr. Procopio served in the waters offshore, he was 
entitled to the presumption of Agent Orange exposure.192 Judge O’Malley 
also concurred, writing a robust support of the pro-veteran canon of 
interpretation and its additional support for the majority’s decision.193 
Judge Chen, joined by Judge Dyk, dissented. Judge Chen found that the 
statute was ambiguous and argued that overruling Haas undermined stare 
decisis with no support, such as a change in law.194 Judge Chen also 
expressed concern that such a decision was imprudent due to Congress’s 
contemporaneous consideration of a new statute regarding the issue of 
veterans who served in the waters offshore of Vietnam.195 The Procopio 
decision, Judge Chen pointed out, will result in a significant increased 
budget for the VA that reflects a policy choice better left to Congress.196 As 
to the pro-veteran canon, Judge Chen commented that it had never been 
 
 187. Id. at 1375. 
 188. 562 U.S. 428, 441 (2011). 
 189. 513 U.S. 115, 117–18 (1994). 
 190. Procopio, 913 F.3d at 1380 (citing Henderson, 562 U.S. 428 (2011); Brown, 513 
U.S. 115, 117–18 (1994)). 
 191. Id. at 1381 (Lourie, J., concurring). 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. at 1382 (O’Malley, J., concurring). 
 194. Id. at 1388–89 (Chen, J., dissenting). 
 195. Id. at 1394–95. 
 196. Id. 
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applied before to Chevron step one analysis and was not sufficient to 
convert an “ambiguous statute into an unambiguous one.”197 
In March 2019, VA Secretary Wilkie indicated that the VA would not 
be seeking review of the Procopio decision by the Supreme Court.198 
B.   Aftermath of Procopio 
Spurred to action by the Procopio decision, Congress passed the Blue 
Water Navy Vietnam Veterans Act of 2019199 (“the Act”) in June of 
2019.200 Congress debated the passage of this bill for years, concerned 
about the impact of opening the class of Vietnam veterans entitled to 
a presumptive exposure to Agent Orange to Blue Water Sailors. The 
budgetary impact was substantial: an estimated $280 million over the 
next ten years in disability benefits alone.201 The VA asserted that up to 
560,000 veterans could be eligible for benefits under the new Act, 
including almost 38,000 Blue Water Vietnam veterans who had 
previously been denied benefits.202 
Section 2 of the Act grants presumptive exposure to veterans serving 
offshore of the coast of Vietnam “not more than [twelve] nautical miles 
seaward of a line commencing on the southwestern demarcation line 
of the waters of Vietnam and Cambodia and intersecting” at eleven 
 
 197. Id. at 1394 (J. Chen, J., dissenting). 
 198. Nikki Wentling, VA Secretary Recommends DOJ Not Challenge Ruling on “Blue 
Water” Benefits, STARS & STRIPES (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.stripes.com/va-secretary-
recommends-doj-not-challenge-ruling-on-blue-water-benefits-1.574387 
[https://perma.cc/GH6S-S55B]. 
 199. Pub. L. No. 116–23, 133 Stat. 966 (2019). 
 200. Id.; see also Leo Shane III, ‘Blue Water’ Veterans Bill Clears Senate, Heads to White 
House for Final Signature, MIL. TIMES (June 12, 2019), https://www.militarytimes.com/ 
news/pentagon-congress/2019/06/12/blue-water-veterans-bill-clears-senate-heads-to-
white-house-for-final-signature [https://perma.cc/NLA8-92K6]. 
 201. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, H.R. 299, BLUE WATER NAVY VIETNAM VETERANS ACT 
OF 2019: AS REPORTED BY THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON VETERANS’ AFFAIRS ON MAY 10, 2019 
6 (2019), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2019-05/hr299.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
AMS9-PXLA]; Amanda Dolasinski, Blue Water Navy Bill Stalls in Senate, but Fight 
Continues, MIL. OFFICERS ASS’N AM. (Dec. 11, 2018) https://www.moaa.org/ 
content/publications-and-media/news-articles/2018-news-articles/blue-water-navy-
bill-stalls-in-senate,-but-fight-continues [https://perma.cc/J8T3-UBX8]. 
 202. Appendix for Respondent’s Brief at 86, Procopio v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 
943 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (No. 19–2184); VA Extends Agent Orange Presumption to 
“Blue Water Navy” Veterans, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFF.: VANTAGE POINT (July 8, 2019), 
https://www.blogs.va.gov/VAntage/62832/va-extends-agent-orange-presumption-
blue-water-navy-veterans [https://perma.cc/YL75-7LPL]. 
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different longitudinal and latitudinal points.203 The Act also provides 
benefits for veterans who served in Korea and the children of 
American veterans stationed in Thailand who were exposed to Agent 
Orange during the Vietnam War.204 Section 3(c)(3) of the Act allowed 
the Secretary to place a stay on pending claims until the law took full 
effect on January 1, 2020 or until the Secretary could implement 
regulations relating to the statute.205 The VA Secretary implemented a 
stay on July 1, 2019, citing the authority granted to him under the 
Act.206 Two-hundred cases had been decided under Procopio between 
April 1 and June 30 of 2019.207 
In July 2019, Mr. Procopio filed a petition for review before the 
Federal Circuit arguing that the Secretary’s stay of his case was 
improper because the Secretary’s authority to stay cases would not 
begin until the law took effect in January 2020.208 Therefore, Mr. 
Procopio argued, his case should be decided under 38 U.S.C. § 1116 
and the court’s decision in Procopio immediately—regardless of the stay 
on claims brought under the new Act.209 The court determined that 
the Secretary’s stay amounted to an “interpretation of general 
applicability formulated and adopted by the agency” under 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(a)(1)(D)and that the Blue Water Act “unambiguously 
authorizes” him to issue the stay.210 The court also found that the 
authority to stay extended to pending claims pursuant to § 1116 and 
ultimately denied the petition for review.211 
C.   Overturning Twenty Years of Case Law: Saunders v. Wilkie 
In 2018, the Federal Circuit made another sweeping decision in 
Saunders v. Wilkie, overturning twenty years of case law at the CAVC. 
Saunders changed the way the VA must define a “disability.” 
 
 203. Blue Water Navy Vietnam Veterans Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116–23, § 2(d) 
(2019) (to be codified in 38 U.S.C. § 1116A(d)). 
 204. Id. §§ 3–4. 
 205. Id. § 3(c)(3)(B). 
 206. Appendix for Petitioner’s Brief at 1, Procopio v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, No. 
19--2184 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 207. Id. at 4. 
 208. Petitioner’s Brief at 16, 27, Procopio v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 943 F.3d 1376 
(Fed. Cir. 2019) (No. 19–2184). 
 209. Id. at 16–18. 
 210. Procopio v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 943 F.3d 1376, 1377, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 211. Id. at 1382. 
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The roots of the Saunders decision are found in the 1999 CAVC 
decision in Sanchez-Benitez v. West212 (“Sanchez-Benitez I”) and the 
subsequent 2001 Federal Circuit decision213 (“Sanchez-Benitez II”). 
In Sanchez-Benitez I, the CAVC considered the issue of whether pain, 
without an accompanying diagnosis, met the requirements of a 
“disability” which can be compensated under federal benefits law. 38 
U.S.C. §§ 1110 and 1131 provide for compensation for disabilities 
incurred during wartime or peacetime where the disability results from 
personal injury or disease contracted in the line of duty. 214 
The veteran, Jose Sanchez-Benitez, filed a disability claim for chronic 
neck pain, even though no formal diagnosis existed, and the VA 
denied his claim.215 On appeal, the CAVC acknowledged that VA 
regulations require pain to be considered in the severity of rating a 
disability but held that “pain alone, without a diagnosed or identifiable 
underlying malady or condition, does not in and of itself constitute a 
disability for which service connection may be granted.”216 
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Mr. Sanchez-Benitez directly 
challenged the CAVC’s holding regarding pain.217 The court discussed 
Mr. Sanchez-Benitez’ challenge after a summation of the CAVC’s 
reasoning in denying his claim: 
His argument is that under the basic disability statutes, pain alone is 
a compensable disability, even if the pain cannot be attributed to any 
current disability. Thus, under Mr. Sanchez-Benitez’s view, a veteran 
who is currently suffering from pain, but who cannot attribute the 
pain to any particular disability, is nonetheless compensibly disabled. 
Mr. Sanchez-Benitez presents an interesting, indeed perplexing, 
question, but not one that we need or can decide in this appeal. Even 
assuming arguendo that free-standing pain wholly unrelated to any 
current disability is a compensable disability, such pain cannot be 
compensable in the absence of proof of an in-service disease or injury 
to which the current pain can be connected by medical evidence. 
Such a “pain alone” claim must fail when there is no sufficient factual 
showing that the pain derives from an in-service disease or injury.218 
 
 212. Sanchez-Benitez v. West (Sanchez-Benitez I), 13 Vet. App. 282 (1999). 
 213. Sanchez-Benitez v. Principi (Sanchez-Benitez II), 259 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 214. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131 (2012). 
 215. Sanchez-Benitez I, 13 Vet. App. at 283–84. 
 216. Id. at 285. 
 217. Sanchez-Benitez II, 259 F.3d at 1360. 
 218. Id. at 1361–62. 
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Rather than issue a holding regarding whether pain alone equates 
to a “disability,” the Federal Circuit found that there was no medical 
nexus to support the contention that Mr. Benitez-Sanchez’s pain was 
due to the trauma he incurred in service, so Mr. Benitez-Sanchez could 
not state a claim.219 The court reiterated the judgment of the CAVC in 
this case “rests on alternative grounds: the failure of proof of medical 
connection of current pain to the alleged in-service neck trauma 
incident, and the statement in the [CAVC’s] opinion that ‘pain alone’ 
is not compensable.”220 
In the two decades following the litigation of Mr. Sanchez-Benitez’s 
claims, the CAVC applied the holding that “pain alone” is not a 
disability from its 1999 Sanchez-Benitez I over one-hundred times. These 
denials included the case, Saunders v. McDonald.221 
In 2008, Melba Saunders filed a claim for chronic knee pain.222 A VA 
medical examiner found that there was no pathology to diagnose the 
source of Ms. Saunders’s knee pain but then gave an opinion that her 
knee pain was related to her active duty service.223 The Board of 
Veterans’ Appeals denied Ms. Saunders’s claim basing its decision on 
Sanchez-Benitez I that pain alone without an underlying condition is not 
a compensable disability.224 
Ms. Saunders appealed to the CAVC arguing that the language in 
Sanchez-Benitez I was “dicta.”225 In its opinion, the CAVC criticized Ms. 
Saunders’s contention in a lengthy single judge opinion on the issue.226 
The court noted that what Ms. Saunders characterized as dicta was 
actually prefaced by the word “holds” making it clear the court was 
establishing precedent.227 The CAVC then tackled Ms. Saunders’s 
argument that “it does not matter what the panel thought it was doing 
or intended to do because the [Federal Circuit] implicitly converted 
the Court’s precedential statement into dicta.”228 The CAVC discussed 
the Federal Circuit’s acknowledgement in Sanchez-Benitez II that the 
 
 219. Sanchez-Benitez II, 259 F.3d 1356, 1361–62 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 220. Id. at 1362. 
 221. Saunders v. McDonald, No. 15-0975, 2016 WL 3002862, at *1 (Vet. App. May 
25, 2016), rev’d, 886 F.3d. 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 222. Id. at *1. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. at *2. 
 226. Id. at *3. 
 227. Id. at *2. 
 228. Id. 
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CAVC’s Sanchez-Benitez I decision rested on alternative grounds to 
include the issue of whether pain alone was a compensable disability.229 
The CAVC determined that the Federal Circuit’s “explicit recognition 
that this Court had decided an important legal issue establishes that the 
Court’s conclusion was, on its face, not dicta.”230 The CAVC goes on to 
note that there is “no rule stating that if the Federal Circuit affirms this 
Court under one of two alternative bases the Court gave for its decision, 
then the other basis for its decision is converted to dicta.”231 
To underscore the importance of its Sanchez-Benitez I holding while 
denying Ms. Saunders’s claim for knee pain, the CAVC added: 
The portion of Sanchez-Benitez that is dispositive in this case is about 
as settled as caselaw can be. Most importantly, no one, to the Court’s 
knowledge, has ever suggested that the rule applied by the Board 
here is dicta. Throughout the nearly two decades since the rule 
stated in Sanchez-Benitez was written, the Court has unfailingly 
deemed it to be good precedential authority . . . It doesn’t take 
much reading between the lines to realize that the appellant wishes 
to neutralize Sanchez-Benitez without going through the arduous steps 
necessary to convince this Court or the one above to overturn 
longstanding precedent.232 
A panel of the CAVC adopted the single-judge opinion issued in 
Saunders after finding no legal error in the reasoning of the judge.233 
Ms. Saunders appealed the CAVC decision. In 2018, the Federal 
Circuit issued its decision in Saunders v. Wilkie.234 Judge O’Malley, 
writing for a three-judge panel which included Judges Newman and 
Dyk, held that “the [CAVC] erred as a matter of law in finding that 
Saunders’s pain alone, absent a specific diagnosis or otherwise 
identified disease or injury, cannot constitute a disability under 38 
U.S.C. § 1110 (2016).”235 When discussing the issue of pain alone as a 
compensable disability, the Federal Circuit began its discussion by 
noting that Ms. Saunders’ case is not impacted by Sanchez-Benitez II 
because the panel that decided that case made no decision on the 
 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. at *3. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. at *4, 6. 
 233. Saunders v. McDonald (Saunders II), No. 15-0975, 2016 WL 4258493, at *1 (Vet. 
App. Aug. 12, 2016), rev’d, 886 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 234. 886 F.3d. 1356, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 235. Id. 
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CAVC’s earlier holding regarding pain alone as a disability.236 The 
court then explained “we characterized as dicta the very holding in 
Sanchez-Benitez I that is at issue here.”237 Criticizing the holding of 
Sanchez-Benitez I, the Federal Circuit found that the CAVC offered no 
support for its contention that pain alone cannot qualify as a disability. 
The Federal Circuit found the CAVC read the provisions of § 1110 out 
of context with the other statutes regarding functional impairment, 
thus rendering the CAVC’s interpretation of disability “illogical.”238 
After outright dismissing any precedential value arising from 
Sanchez-Benitez I and Sanchez-Benitez II, the Federal Circuit then 
analyzed the meaning of the term “disability” in 38 U.S.C. § 1110 and 
determined the word means a “functional impairment of earning 
capacity, not the underlying cause of said disability.”239 The Federal 
Circuit held that because pain can diminish bodily function, “pain 
need not be diagnosed as connected to a current underlying condition 
to function as an impairment.”240 In one sentence referring to the 
holding of Sanchez-Benitez I as dicta, which may not have been entirely 
clear from the Sanchez-Benitez II opinion as evidenced by the CAVC’s 
later reliance on its original holding, the Federal Circuit overturned 
two decades of case law at the CAVC with the stroke of a pen. The 
entire impact of Saunders will take several years to measure as the VA 
implements the Federal Circuit’s opinion and teaches it to the lowest-
level decision makers. However, the wide-sweeping change in the 
definition of “disability” cannot be overstated. 
V.    ADDRESSING DELAYS IN THE VA SYSTEM 
Under the All Writs Act,241 Article I courts may issue writs necessary 
or appropriate in aid of their jurisdictions. With respect to mandamus 
petitions alleging unreasonable delay, “[b]ecause the statutory 
obligation of a Court of Appeals to review on the merits may be 
defeated by an agency that fails to resolve disputes, a Circuit Court may 
resolve claims of unreasonable delay in order to protect its future 
jurisdiction.”242 With regard to the CAVC specifically, its jurisdictional 
 
 236. Id. at 1361–62. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. at 1355–56. 
 239. Id. at 1363. 
 240. Id. at 1364. 
 241. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2012). 
 242. Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC (TRAC), 750 F.2d 70, 76 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
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statute, 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(2), provides that the CAVC may, “to the 
extent necessary to its decision . . . compel action of the Secretary 
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.”243 
Like many veterans before them, the nine appellants in the Martin 
v. O’Rourke244 case petitioned the CAVC to issue writs of mandamus in 
response to alleged unreasonable delays.245 The veterans alleged the 
delays in their cases constituted a violation of their rights under the Due 
Process Clause.246 In Martin, the Federal Circuit determined the CAVC 
used the wrong standard to measure unreasonable delay when it used 
the test first articulated by the CAVC in Costanza v. West247 in 1999.248 
In Costanza, the veteran asserted that the VA’s delay in certifying his appeal 
to the Board, a ministerial act, took too long when almost one year had 
transpired from the date he filed his appeal.249 The CAVC, in Martin, denied 
the writ, stating, that when a petition is based on such a delay, the Court’s 
precedents support the veteran’s right to such a writ when the veteran 
demonstrates the alleged delay is tantamount to the Secretary’s arbitrary 
refusal to act, bearing in mind the demands on the Secretary’s resources.250 
In rejecting the standard described in Costanza, the Federal Circuit 
found “[t]here is little to be said about this standard’s origin.”251 
Accepting the appellants’ suggestion, the Federal Circuit found the 
analysis set out in the D.C. Circuit’s 1984 decision in Telecommunications 
Research & Action Center v. FCC252 (TRAC) “provides a more balanced 
approach because it requires consideration of the veterans’ interests 
and does not require a showing of intent.”253 Given the adoption of 
TRAC, the Federal Circuit concluded that if the CAVC finds the delay 
unreasonable under TRAC, it need not conduct a separate due process 
analysis.254 The Federal Circuit remanded the claims that were not 
 
 243. 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(2). 
 244. 891 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 245. Id. at 1340. 
 246. Id. at 1342. 
 247. 12 Vet. App. 133 (1999). 
 248. Martin, 891 F.3d at 1344. 
 249. Costanza, 12 Vet. App. at 134. 
 250. Martin, 891 F.3d at 1344 (citing Ribavdo v. Nicholson 20 Vet. App. 552, 555 (2007)). 
 251. Id. 
 252. 750 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 253. Martin, 891 F.3d at 1345. 
 254. Id. at 1348–49. 
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mooted by the VA during the pendency of the appeal to the CAVC for 
the proper analysis under TRAC.255 
TRAC outlines a six-factor test for analyzing a claim of unreasonable delay 
to determine “whether the agency’s delay is so egregious as to warrant 
mandamus.”256 The factors include the following: 
1. the time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by a “rule of 
reason;” 
2. where Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of the speed 
with which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory 
scheme may supply content for this rule of reason; 
3. delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are 
less tolerable when human health and welfare are at stake; 
4. the court should consider the effect of expediting delayed action on agency 
activities of a higher or competing priority; 
5. the court should also take into account the nature and extent of the 
interests prejudiced by delay; and 
6. the court need not “find any impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude 
in order to hold that agency action is ‘unreasonably delayed.’”257 
The CAVC has relied on Martin many times in the past year, 
especially in its single-judge opinions disposing of writs. In the 100 
post-Martin CAVC cases addressing unreasonable delay (through 
February 29, 2020) all were denied except one: Godsey v. Wilkie.258 
These denials often recite the language in Martin that a delay may be 
the result of the VA following its statutory duty to assist and not a result 
of agency inaction, without deep analysis.259 
Only two CAVC precedential panel decisions have addressed Martin. 
Godsey v. Wilkie, discussed further below, certified a class where claimants 
experienced unreasonable delay with regard to certain ministerial acts in 
the appeals process, ironically almost identical to the challenge in Costanza 
 
 255. Id. at 1349. See Monk v. Shulkin (Monk II), 855 F.3d 1312, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2017) 
(noting that the VA’s action on certain claims rendered those claims moot). 
 256. TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80. 
 257. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 258. 31 Vet. App. 207 (2019) [discussed below in Section VI. D.]. 
 259. See, e.g., Bowlin v. Wilkie, No. 19-2576, 2019 WL 3307851, at *2 (Vet. App. July 
24, 2019) (denying veterans claim as moot despite multi-year delay and no TRAC 
analysis); Cantrell v. Wilkie, No. 19-1559, 2019 WL 2426166, at *2–3 n.1 (Vet. App. 
June 11, 2019) (finding that, despite no TRAC analysis, the veteran had not exhausted 
available remedies and was, therefore, not entitled to writ); Sorkness v. Wilkie, No. 18-
2611, 2018 WL 4408980, at *3 (Vet. App. Sept. 17, 2018) (finding no egregious delay). 
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twenty years earlier.260 In the other panel decision, Monk v. Wilkie,261 the 
CAVC denied a petition for extraordinary relief.262 
In Monk v. Wilkie (Monk IV), the CAVC highlighted the absence of a 
“hard and fast rule with respect to the point in time at which delay [in 
the adjudication of VA claims] becomes unreasonable.”263 It explained 
that Martin states that the “rule of reason” requires a review of “the 
particular agency action for which unreasonable delay is alleged” and 
an evaluation of the reasonableness of the delay given the specific 
factual circumstance before the court.264 Accordingly, various factors 
inform the reasonableness inquiry and “more complex and substantive 
agency actions take longer than purely ministerial ones.”265 
With regard to the six petitioners in Monk IV, the CAVC found that 
all but one, William Dolphin, had withdrawn their claims or their 
claims were moot due to VA action.266 For Mr. Dolphin’s situation in 
particular, the CAVC attributed the delay in the VA’s adjudication of 
his claims to the fulfillment of substantive agency actions to comply 
with statutory duties.267 The CAVC cited several details in Mr. Dolphin’s 
claims history, from his sixty-page transcript to the submission of more 
than 1600 pages of military and medical records to the ten additional 
medical examinations to evaluate PTSD, TBI, seizures, headaches, 
peripheral nerves, lower back and shoulder pain, hearing loss, heart 
disease, and diabetes claims.268 The CAVC’s decision focused on the 
VA’s last action in the appeal, not the totality of the time Mr. Dolphin’s 
 
 260. Id. at 215. 
 261. 32 Vet. App. 87 (2019) [currently on appeal as Federal Circuit Case No. 20-1305]. 
 262. Id. at *14. The Monk case has led to several reported opinions at the CAVC and 
Federal Circuit levels. The nomenclature used by the CAVC in its October 2019 order 
will be used in this Article. See, e.g., Monk v. McDonald (Monk I), No. 15-1280, 2015 
WL 3407451 (Vet. App. May 27, 2015) (CAVC’s decision denying class certification); 
Monk v. Shulkin (Monk II), 855 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (authorizing the use of the 
class action device); Monk v. Wilkie (Monk III), 30 Vet. App. 167 (2018) (CAVC’s 
decision to deny class certification following remand); Monk v. Wilkie (Monk IV), 32 
Vet. App. 87 (2019).  
 263. Monk IV, 32 Vet. App. at 102 (quoting Martin v. O’Rourke, 891 F.3d 1338, 1346 
(Fed. Cir. 2018)). 
 264. Id. at 111 (Allen, J., concurring in part) (quoting Martin, 891 F.3d at 1345). 
 265. Martin, 891 F.3d at 1345–46. 
 266. Monk IV, 32 Vet. App. at 93, 97 (following the remand from the Federal Circuit 
an amended writ petition was filed naming an additional six class representatives, 
including Mr. William Dolphin). 
 267. Id. at 103. 
 268. Id. 
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case was pending, which was over five years. In his dissent, Judge Allen 
criticized the majority’s “slicing and dicing” analysis of Mr. Dolphin’s VA 
“odyssey.”269 He highlighted that under the majority’s analysis, and the VA’s 
concession at oral argument, even a delay of 100 years would satisfy TRAC 
factor one.270 This decision is currently on appeal at the Federal Circuit.271 
Accordingly, while Martin is helpful to the extent that it provides a 
broader and a more favorable analysis for veterans considering filing a 
petition requesting a writ of mandamus, the end results appear to be 
the same as under the Costanza test, where writs were not granted. 
Martin is important not only for the adoption of the TRAC analysis, 
but also because of Judge Moore’s powerful concurrence which should 
be required reading for every American. She notes that the appeals 
process “takes over five and a half years on average from the time a 
notice of disagreement is filed until the Board issues a decision, which 
often sets the stage for more proceedings on remand.”272 She reminds 
us that during this uncertain process, veterans may be lacking daily 
necessities, including food and shelter.273 This deprivation occurs 
when years later these same veterans are found to be entitled to the 
funds.274 Noting that three of the veterans in the nine cases before the 
court in Martin died while their appeal was pending, Judge Moore 
reminds us that it is up to the courts to protect these individuals, 
concluding with this call to action: 
The men and women in these cases protected this country and the 
freedoms we hold dear; they were disabled in the service of their 
country; the least we can do is properly resolve their disability claims 
so that they have the food and shelter necessary for survival. It takes 
on average six and a half years for a veteran to challenge a VBA 
determination and get a decision on remand. God help this nation 
if it took that long for these brave men and women to answer the call 
to serve and protect. We owe them more.275 
 
 
 
   269.   Id. at 108, 112 (Allen, J., dissenting in part). 
   270.   Id. at 112. 
   271.   Brief for Petitioner, Monk v. Wilkie, No. 20-1305 (Fed. Cir. 2020). 
 272. Martin v. O’Rourke, 891 F.3d 1338, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Moore, J., concurring). 
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VI.    CLASS ACTIONS: AGGREGATE PROCEDURE IN VETERANS CASES 
A.   Background to the Federal Circuit Appeal 
The Federal Circuit has handed down several instrumental decisions 
in the area of class action litigation. One such case is the Monk line of 
cases. Conley Monk served in the United States Marine Corps during 
the Vietnam War.276 He later suffered from several disabilities that he 
believed to be related to his military service, including PTSD.277 He 
filed a claim with the VA in February of 2012.278 
In 2013, the VA notified Mr. Monk that it denied his claims because 
his discharge was “other than honorable.”279 Mr. Monk timely appealed 
this decision by filing the proper form, known as a Notice of 
Disagreement (NOD), within one year of the denial.280 A hearing took 
place in February 2014.281 
More than one year later, in March 2015, Mr. Monk learned from 
his congresswoman that the VA would not process his appeal until it 
received records from the Board of Corrections for Naval Records 
(BCNR) regarding his discharge status.282 
Mr. Monk then filed a petition for a writ for mandamus at the CAVC, 
asserting that the delay the VA took in deciding his claim was 
unreasonable and asking the CAVC to compel action.283 He sought 
class certification on behalf of all similarly situated veterans.284 His 
proposed class included all veterans who had applied for VA benefits, 
had timely filed an NOD, had not received a decision within twelve 
months, and had demonstrated medical or financial hardship as 
 
 276. Monk v. Shulkin (Monk II), 855 F.3d 1312, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. 
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 282. Opening Brief of Claimant-Appellant at 12–13, Monk v. McDonald (Monk I), No. 15-
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 283. Monk I, 15-1280, 2015 WL 3407451, at *2. 
 284. Id. 
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defined by 38 U.S.C. §§ 7107(a)(2)(B)–(C).285 Mr. Monk asserted that 
the All Writs Act provides authority for the CAVC to aggregate cases.286 
On May 27, 2015, the CAVC refused to grant class certification, 
finding it lacked authority to certify a class.287 On July 8, 2015, the 
CAVC issued an order denying Mr. Monk’s individual petition for 
mandamus relief.288 It found that the VA’s delay in adjudicating Mr. 
Monk’s disability claim resulted, at least in part, from the VA’s need 
for certain BCNR records.289 
B.   The Federal Circuit Decision 
The Federal Circuit appeal focused solely on the issue of whether 
the CAVC had the authority to entertain class actions. During the 
pendency of the proceedings, the VA had determined that Mr. Monk was 
entitled to receive VA benefits at the one hundred percent level, 
rendering the underlying issue of delay moot.290 Interestingly, the VA 
Secretary conceded in oral argument that the CAVC in fact had authority 
to handle class actions but asserted Mr. Monk’s claim was moot, and the 
requested class was not proper for class action treatment.291 
The Federal Circuit first determined that the VA’s grant of benefits 
during the course of the proceedings did not moot the request for class 
certification.292 Relying upon United States Parole Commission v. 
Geraghty293 and Genesis HealthCare Corp. v. Symczyk,294 both Supreme 
Court cases addressing mootness in class actions, the Federal Circuit 
found it significant that Mr. Monk’s claim was granted after his request 
for class certification was made and denied.295 The Federal Circuit also 
 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. at *3 (citing prior CAVC decisions where the court found it lacked authority 
to certify class actions including Am. Legion v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 1, 3–4 (2007); 
Henderson v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 272, 278 (1997) (per curiam); Harrison v. 
Derwinksi, 1 Vet. App. 438, 439 (1991) (en banc); Lefkowitz v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 
439, 440 (1991) (per curiam)). 
 288. Monk v. McDonald, No. 15-1280, 2015 WL 4139012, at *3 (Vet. App. July 8, 
2015), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Monk v. Shulkin, 855 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. at 1316. 
 291. Oral Arg. at 14:40–20:19, 22:58–23:07, Monk II, 855 F.3d 1312 (2017), 
http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=2015-7092.mp3. 
 292. Monk II, 855 F.3d at 1317. 
 293. 445 U.S. 388 (1980). 
 294. 569 U.S. 66 (2013). 
 295. Monk II, 855 F.3d at 1317. 
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noted that another class member, Mr. Van Allen, moved to join Mr. Monk’s 
proposed class (a motion denied by the CAVC), distinguishing the case 
from Genesis, where no other individuals moved to join the class.296 
Most significantly, the Federal Circuit recognized that sometimes a 
class action is the only way to get an issue answered.297 A “class-action 
claim is not necessarily moot upon the termination of the named 
plaintiff’s claim” in circumstances in which “other persons similarly 
situated will continue to be subject to the challenged conduct,” but 
“the challenged conduct was effectively unreviewable, because no 
plaintiff possessed a personal stake in the suit long enough for 
litigation to run its course.”298 This is an important ruling in light of 
the fact that veterans’ writ petitions, based upon unnecessary delay, 
often become moot by the VA’s response to the writ.299 
The Federal Circuit found that the authority for the use of the class 
action device in CAVC proceedings existed in three ways: under the All 
Writs Act; pursuant to the CAVC’s own enabling statutes; and by virtue of 
the CAVC’s inherent powers.300 Each of these bases is discussed below. 
First, concurring with the Second Circuit’s decision in United States 
ex rel. Sero v. Preiser,301 the Federal Circuit reiterated that the All Writs 
Act permits courts to create “appropriate modes of procedure, by 
analogy to existing rules or otherwise in conformity with judicial 
usage.”302 In this regard, the court explained that it could employ 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 analysis to determine whether class 
certification is appropriate.303 The relevant factors found in the rule 
include whether the class is so numerous that joinder of all members 
is impracticable; whether common questions of law or fact exist; 
whether the claims of the representative parties are typical for the class; 
and whether the representative parties will fairly and adequately 
protect the interest of the class.304 Recognizing that the CAVC’s 
jurisdiction extends to “compel action of the Secretary unlawfully 
 
 296. Id.; See Symczyk, 569 U.S. at 70 (highlighting issues of conditional certification). 
 297. Monk II, 855 F.3d at 1320–21. 
 298. Symczyk, 569 U.S. at 75–76 (internal quotations omitted). 
 299. See Ebanks v. Shulkin, 877 F.3d 1037, 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that the 
Federal Circuit later found class certification as an appropriate procedural device). 
 300. Monk II, 855 F.3d at 1318. 
 301. 506 F.2d 1115, 1125–26 (2d Cir. 1974). 
 302. Monk II, 855 F.3d at 1318–19. 
 303. Id. at 1319. 
 304. Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 23). 
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withheld or unreasonably delayed,”305 the Federal Circuit said it could 
find “no principled reason why the [CAVC] cannot rely on the All 
Writs Act to aggregate claims in aid of its jurisdiction.”306 
Second, with regard to the CAVC’s own statutory authority, the 
Federal Circuit noted that nothing in the Veterans Judicial Review Act 
(VJRA) restricts the use of the class action device.307 Rather, 38 U.S.C. 
§ 7264(a) grants express authority for the CAVC to create its own rules 
necessary to exercise its jurisdiction.308 The court explained that, just 
as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and 
bankruptcy courts have found ways to aggregate claims, the CAVC may 
do so as well.309 
Third, with regard to the final underpinning for CAVC authority to 
entertain class actions, the Federal Circuit explained that the CAVC’s 
enabling statutes do not, by their terms, preclude the class action 
device.310 The CAVC debunked the statutory impediments highlighted 
in its earlier decisions, including the provisions that the CAVC review 
individual Board decisions following a notice of appeal, without a de 
novo trial.311 Upon review of the jurisdictional statutes as a whole, the 
CAVC found those provisions to be too limited.312 Again, the court 
explained that § 7261 broadly grants the CAVC authority to “compel 
action of the Secretary unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.”313 
Considering the CAVC’s statutory authority to craft its own rules, the 
Federal Circuit found that the CAVC’s rule disallowing class actions 
constituted an abuse of discretion.314 In balancing the CAVC’s 
reasoning for categorically refusing to certify class actions, the Federal 
Circuit identified significant potential benefits veterans would gain 
 
 305. 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a) (2012). 
 306. Monk II, 855 F.3d at 1319. 
 307. Id. at 1320 
 308. Id. 
 309. Id. at 1319–21. 
 310. Id. at 1320–22. 
 311. Id. at 1320. 
 312. Id. (commenting that the CAVC had identified three statutory impediments to 
their authority to hear class actions in Harrison: (1) 38 U.S.C. § 7252 “limits the 
jurisdiction of this Court to the review of [Board] decisions”; (2) 38 U.S.C. § 7261(c) 
prohibits fact finding, stating “[i]n no event shall findings of fact . . . be subject to trial 
de novo by the Court”; and (3) 38 U.S.C. § 7266 provides that “each person adversely 
affected by such a [Board] decision must file a notice of appeal”) (alteration in original). 
 313. Id. at 1319. 
 314. Id. at 1318. 
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through an aggregate claims process: efficiency, consistency, fairness, 
and improvement of access to legal and expert assistance to those with 
limited resources.315 
The Federal Circuit’s decision recognizes the reality many veterans face 
in the arduous VA appeal process. Recall that the VA granted Mr. Monk’s 
disability claims with a one hundred percent rating during his appellate 
process, arguably mooting his claim.316 This is not an atypical development. 
Indeed, in the Monk II decision, the Federal Circuit points out that writs 
challenging the VA’s delay in adjudicating appeals often evade judicial 
review because the VA usually acts promptly to resolve mandamus 
petitions.317 Citing CAVC Judges Lance and Hagel, the court said: 
[W]hen the [CAVC] orders the VA to respond to a petition “set[ting] 
forth a well-pleaded complaint that the processing of a claim has been 
improperly delayed,” the “great majority of the time” the VA “responds 
by correcting the problem within the short time allotted for a 
response, and the petition is dismissed as moot because the relief 
sought has been obtained.”318 
Further, the court highlighted instances, raised by amicus curiae, 
where the VA had granted full benefits to veterans whose claims were 
scheduled for CAVC precedential review, while denying similarly 
situated veterans benefits on the same grounds.319 
C.   Monk III 
When the matter was remanded to the CAVC, Mr. Monk filed an 
Amended Petition for Extraordinary Relief, deleting that portion of the 
proposed class definition that limited the proposed class to those “veterans 
facing financial or medical hardship.”320 The Amended Petition added 
eight additional named representatives.321 On October 26, 2017, the CAVC 
issued a per curiam order inviting amici participation and requesting 
guidance on twelve discrete questions including, inter alia, whether Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 23 should be used as the model rule; how fact 
finding will be conducted; and whether class relief is superior to a 
 
 315. Id. at 1320. 
 316. Id. at 1316. 
 317. Id. at 1320–21 (citing Young v. Shinseki, 25 Vet. App. 201, 215 (2012)). 
 318. Id. at 1321. 
 319. Id. (citing Brief for Am. Legion as Amici Curiae at 18–25, Monk v. Shulkin, 855 
F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (Nos. 2015-7092; 2015-7106)). 
 320. Monk v. Wilkie (Monk III), 30 Vet. App. 167, 170 (2018). 
 321. Id. 
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precedential decision.322 In response, the court received nine amicus 
briefs.323 On August 23, 2018, the court, sitting en banc, ultimately denied 
the requested class certification, issuing a split decision with four judges 
supporting the order and four judges dissenting.324 
The “crux” of the certification decision centered upon the commonality 
element.325 Judge Schoelen, writing in favor of denying class certification, 
noted that petitioners assert the length of time they have waited for 
resolution of their pending appeals may vary and acknowledged petitioners’ 
contention that “this variance is unimportant so long as the wait is more than 
[twelve] months.”326 The question, as simplified, nonetheless precluded class 
certification because the petitioners’ legal theories required the court to 
determine whether the VA’s delay was unreasonable.327 As to the 
reasonableness question, Judge Schoelen explained that the court decides 
whether any delay is unreasonable by examining the substantive claims 
underlying their petition and the justification the VA offers for the 
delay.328 Relying on the recent Martin case decided by the Federal Circuit, 
Judge Schoelen noted that delay might be the result of “complete 
inaction” by the VA or the VA’s statutory duty to assist a claimant in 
developing the case.329 Whether the VA’s delay was reasonable is integral 
to each of the petitioner’s claims and as a result, no commonality exists.330 
Judge Davis concurred, stating: 
[A] class must have claims that “depend on a common contention” that 
is “capable of classwide resolution” such that a “determination of its 
truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each 
one of the claims in one stroke.” Here, there are countless different 
reasons for processing time for each claim; therefore, one answer will 
not resolve all claims. Significantly, claims processing time does not 
necessarily mean, “delay.”331 
 
 322. Monk v. Shulkin, No. 15-1280, 2017 WL 4864521, at *1, *2 (Ct. Vet. App. Oct. 
17, 2017) (per curiam). 
 323. General Docket, Monk v. Shulkin, 2017 WL 4864521 (Vet. App. 2017) (No. 15-1280). 
 324. Monk III, 30 Vet. App. at 169, 181, 184, 189. Judges Schoelen, Davis, Pietsch 
and Meredith wrote that the commonality element ultimately defeated class 
certification in the Monk context, while Judges Allen, Bartley, Toth and Greenberg 
believed a class should have been certified. Id. at 181. 
 325. Id. at 175. 
 326. Id. 
 327. Id. at 176. 
 328. Id. 
 329. Id. at 177. 
 330. Id. at 182 (Davis, J., concurring). 
 331. Id. 
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Judge Davis was not a VA apologist, stating five to seven years for 
resolution of an appeal is “unreasonable.”332 He called for “radical 
change” to address the 450,000 cases in the VA’s backlog.333 Radical 
change includes, in his view, the following elements: “[f]inality, a 
closed record, aggregate claims resolution, alternative dispute 
resolution, and claims waivers for immediate cash payments.”334 Chief 
Judge of the CAVC at the time of the opinion, he also noted the 
historic significance of the Monk III case in the CAVC jurisprudence, 
calling it a “seismic shift.”335 
Judge Allen, writing for three judges who would grant class 
certification, was undeterred by the individual questions raised by 
Judge Schoelen, warning that not all merits questions must be resolved 
in the class certification analysis.336 Using a boat analogy, he wrote: 
Assume that each class member’s claim is a small boat floating on 
the water in a pool. The commonality inquiry (for this metaphorical 
pool) is trained on whether there is a single action that will cause 
the pool to drain or fill such that all the boats will move together. If 
there is, there is commonality among the boats because there is a 
single action that affects them all “in one stroke.”337 
Judge Allen identified the “fundamental problem with the plurality’s 
reasoning” as the failure to apprehend the theory of the case presented 
by petitioners: “[t]heir theory is that there is a period of time that is 
simply too long for a claimant to wait for a decision.”338 
Judge Greenberg wrote separately stating, “‘courts may not abdicate 
their role and deny any effective remedy’ to victims of administrative 
delay simply ‘because the problem is difficult.’”339 He asserted the CAVC 
always had jurisdiction to determine class actions, prior to Monk I, and 
any limitations have been self-imposed by the CAVC itself.340 Citing 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Wal-Mart, Judge Greenberg states the 
CAVC must act as the “glue” in the fractured VA adjudicatory system.341 
 
 332. Id. at 181–82. 
 333. Id. at 182. 
 334. Id. 
 335. Id. at 184. 
 336. Id. at 190 (Allen, J., concurring in part). 
 337. Id. at 191. 
 338. Id. at 194. 
 339. Id. at 201 (Greenberg, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
 340. Id. 
 341. Id. at 202. 
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Despite the differing (and entertaining) opinions in the remanded 
Monk III case, all judges agreed that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 
would be the appropriate model for a class action rule in the CAVC in 
the future.342 The case is now on appeal again at the Federal Circuit at 
the time of this writing, as is the dismissal of the putative class 
members’ individual claims for extraordinary relief.343 
D.   Class Actions in the CAVC Following Monk 
As noted above, the CAVC determined it will use aggregate resolution 
procedures in appropriate cases initiated by a petition. Notwithstanding 
the denial of class certification in the Monk case, the CAVC has certified 
three classes at the time of this writing. 
The first class action certified by the CAVC was Godsey v. Wilkie, in 
which the issue again was undue delay.344 In contrast to Monk, the court 
limited the Godsey class to a single segment of the appeals process 
involving a pure ministerial action by the VA—the time it takes the VA 
to “certify” a case to the Board following receipt of the Form 9.345 
Before February 19, 2019, a claimant dissatisfied with a VA benefits 
decision could appeal that decision to the Board by filing a NOD and, 
ultimately, a Substantive Appeal, using a Form 9.346 Once a claimant 
files a Form 9, the VA would “certify” the case and transfer the 
appellate record to the Board with a Form 8.347 
In 2017, when the Godsey petition was filed, it took the VA, on average, 
773 days to certify a case to the Board after receiving a Form 9 and an 
additional 321 days after that to transfer the record to the Board.348 
The Godsey petitioners asserted the three-year timespan was so 
unreasonable that it amounted to a deprivation, which stripped them 
 
 342. The author is on the CAVC’s Rules Advisory Committee and the Committee has 
been charged with creating the Rule to be adopted as part of the Court’s Rules of Practice. 
 343. On October 23, 2019, the CAVC denied the remaining claims in Monk finding 
the individual claims of all named representatives other than Dolphin were withdrawn 
or moot. See Monk v. Wilkie (Monk IV), 32 Vet. App. 87, 108 (2019). As to Mr. Dolphin, 
the CAVC (with Judges Allen and Greenberg dissenting) found that under the TRAC 
factors, no unreasonable delay existed. Id. Judge Pietsch dissented because of concerns 
with jurisdiction. Id. at 117. 
 344. Godsey v. Wilkie, 31 Vet. App. 207, 215 (2019). 
 345. Id. 
 346. Id. at 213–14 (referencing 38 U.S.C. § 7105(a) (2012)). 
 347. See id. at 216 (explaining the VA’s application of the certification process 
established in 38 C.F.R. § 19.35 (2018)). 
 348. Id. 
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of their constitutional right to due process.349 They requested class 
certification and an order compelling the VA Secretary to expedite the 
appeals certification and transfer process.350 
The CAVC agreed, although it modified the proposed class to those 
veterans waiting more than eighteen months.351 It also granted the 
extraordinary relief in the same decision, ordering the Secretary to 
certify cases within 120 days or take other action to develop the veteran’s 
claim.352 The CAVC made clear that by adjudicating the merits and the 
class decision at the same time in Godsey was not the adoption of a 
general policy for deciding such matters concurrently in future cases.353 
However, given the unique circumstances surrounding the Godsey case, 
particularly the nature of the alleged injury and the need for rapid 
remedial action, the CAVC resolved both matters in a single order.354 
The second class action certified by the CAVC was Wolfe v. Wilkie,355 
in which the CAVC certified a class of veterans asserting entitlement to 
reimbursement for emergency medical expenses at non-VA facilities.356 
The Wolfe case came with a complex procedural background including 
an earlier CAVC opinion in Staab v. McDonald,357 which found that the 
Secretary’s implementing regulations relating to these reimbursements 
were contrary to law.358 The CAVC’s frustration was palpable, and the 
opinion read as a stinging rebuke to the agency. The CAVC admonished 
the VA for misleading veterans into believing they were not entitled to 
reimbursements and for implementing regulations directly contrary to 
the court’s ruling.359 
 
 349. Id. at 214. 
 350. Id. 
 351. Id. at 221–22. 
 352. Id. at 230. 
 353. Id. at 224–25. 
 354. Judge Pietsch dissented, citing her concerns about the lack of any class action 
rules in place at the CAVC. Id. at 231 (Pietsch, J., dissenting). With regard to the merits, 
Judge Pietsch determined that VA is well aware of the delays and she would “let the 
Secretary run his agency.” Id. at 233. 
 355. 32 Vet. App. 1, 11 (2019). 
 356. Id. at 12. 
 357. 28 Vet. App. 50, 55 (2016) (holding that congressional intent required veterans to 
be reimbursed for emergency medical costs not covered by third-party insurer). 
 358. Wolfe, 32 Vet. App. at 11–12 (expressing condemnation for the Secretary’s post-
Staab regulations). 
 359. Id. 
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The CAVC certified the class proposed by petitioner, which included 
veterans whose claims were or would be denied.360 It held the regulation 
found in 38 C.F.R. § 17.1005(a)(5) unlawful, required readjudication of 
affected claims, and ordered the VA to send corrective letters to veterans.361 
The third class action certified by the CAVC is Skaar v. Wilkie.362 In this 
case, the CAVC certified a class of veterans who served in Palomeres, 
Spain and were exposed to radiation arising from a midair collision in 
1966.363 The merits of the class action involved presumptions relating to 
radiogenic diseases. With regard to the class certification analysis, the 
CAVC narrowed the proposed class definition which included an array 
of veterans whose claims spanned the adjudication process: from those 
who had never filed a claim to those who never appealed a denial.364 
After modifying the class definition365 and limiting the claim to a 
single regulatory challenge, the CAVC used Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23 as its model, engaging in the common Rule 23(a) 
analysis including the requirements of numerosity, commonalty, 
typicality and adequacy.366 The CAVC found that injunctive relief was 
proper, and that class action device was the superior method for 
litigating the claim.367 Notably, the CAVC created a presumption 
against class certification because of its ability to render binding 
precedential decisions.368 
Presumptions, by definition, can be overcome and the majority in 
Skaar identified several none-exclusive factors that advocates should 
consider in the request for class certification.369 The judicially created 
presumption can be overcome by showing, with a preponderance of the 
evidence, the following factors which weigh in favor of certification: 
 
 360. Id. 
 361. Id. at 40. But see id. at 42 (Falvey, J., dissenting) (finding that a writ was unnecessary). 
 362. 32 Vet. App. 156 (2019). 
 363. Id. at 167. 
 364. Id. at 179–80. 
 365. The majority in Skaar found that Palomeres veterans who had not timely 
appealed decisions were not part of the class, as equitable tolling would not apply. Id. 
at 186–90 (explaining that they could later file supplemental claims if needed). Judge 
Schoelen, in her concurrence, would have allowed the past and expired subgroups but 
she would exclude “future” claimants. Id. at 203–06 (Schoelen, J., concurring in part). 
 366. Id. at 189-94. 
 367. Id. at 189–95. 
 368. Id. at 196. 
 369. Id. at 197. 
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1. the challenge is collateral to a claim for benefits (in Skaar, this 
factor was met because the challenge involved VA’s adherence 
to a regulation, not interference with agency process with regard 
to his particular claim) 
2. the litigation of the challenge involves compiling a complex 
factual record (in Skaar, this was technical and scientific 
information about dosage requirements and processes) 
3. the appellate record is sufficiently developed to permit judicial 
review of the challenged conduct (in Skaar, the record was 
complete because the challenge was to the compliance with the 
regulation, in contrast to a determination as to the proper 
dosage methodology which would not be suitable for class 
certification because of the lack of record); and 
4. the putative class has alleged sufficient facts suggesting a need 
for remedial enforcement (in Skaar, the advanced age and 
radiogenic disease supported this factor).370 
These factors are weighted equally and on a case-by-case basis.371 
In her concurrence in part, Judge Schoelen suggested an additional 
two factors to consider: (1) whether the challenge involves complex 
technical or scientific matters, and (2) whether the conduct is 
“systemic,” meaning a significant number of claims involve the issue.372 
Judges Falvey, Pietsch, and Meredith dissented, questioning the 
necessity and efficacy of class certification given the CAVC’s authority 
to issue precedential decisions which bind the VA.373 The dissent urged 
that class actions are only appropriate in appeals (as opposed to 
petitions for a writ) where there is a final Board decision.374 The dissent 
also asserted that as an additional jurisdictional matter, the class 
certification decision must be made only upon the record before the 
agency and the evidence used by the majority in its analysis was not 
part of that record.375 In sum, the dissent criticized the majority’s 
unnecessary “legal innovation” beyond the power granted by Congress, 
when a precedential decision would have had the same result.376 
 
 
 370. Id. at 197–99. 
 371. Id. at 197. 
 372. Id. at 207–08 (Schoelen, J., concurring in part). 
 373. Id. at 208–09 (Falvey, J., dissenting). 
 374. Id. at 209.  
 375. Id. at 216–19. 
 376. Id. at 224–25. 
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Over the past few years and with the urging and guidance of the 
Federal Circuit, we have seen the legal landscape for veterans change. 
Unreasonable delay, the bane of veterans nationwide, can be 
addressed by writs, which should be analyzed under a revamped 
standard, as described in Martin. Unreasonable delay can also be 
addressed on a class-wide basis, as established in Godsey. 
With regard to class actions raising issues other than delay, a path 
has been revealed in Skaar. Although Skaar adds an impediment to 
class certification by virtue of the new presumption against class 
certification and the additional multifactor analysis, the CAVC’s 
acknowledgement of the importance of the class action device in 
veterans cases is the “seismic” change first noted by Judge Davis in 
Monk III. In Skaar, the CAVC acknowledged that the class action device 
can address “repetitive wrongdoing,” improve access to justice, prevent 
the VA’s mooting of claims scheduled for precedential review and 
correct systemic errors.377 This is all good news for veterans advocates 
who continue to argue for meaningful advances under the law for 
veterans, on behalf of a grateful nation.378 
VII.    EQUITABLE REMEDIES 
The Federal Circuit has reviewed many cases surrounding equitable 
remedies in the past decade, since Henderson v. Shinseki.379 In Henderson, 
the Court found the 120-day notice of appeal deadline applicable to 
cases filed with the CAVC lacked jurisdictional attributes, and, 
therefore, a failure to meet that deadline did not have the same strict 
consequences.380 Specifically, the Supreme Court found that this filing 
was not jurisdictional, and thus, the CAVC could toll the 120-day 
statute of limitations when equity demanded.381 The Court focused 
heavily on the pro-veteran slant of the federal veterans benefits laws..382 
 
 377. Id. at 179. 
 378. Abraham Lincoln famously stated in his second inaugural address that the 
nation would “care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow, and his 
orphan.” This promise to serve and honor the men and women who are America’s 
veterans has become the mission of the VA. U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFS., About VA, 
Mission, Vision, Core Values & Goals, https://www.va.gov/about_va/mission.asp 
[https://www.va.gov/about_va/mission.asp] (last updated Aug. 20, 2015). 
 379. 562 U.S. 428 (2011). 
 380. Id. 
 381. Id. at 434, 441. 
 382. Id. at 431, 437–38. 
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Similar to Henderson, in James v. Wilkie,383 the Federal Circuit reviewed 
equitable tolling principles applicable to an untimely notice of appeal.384 
In Burris v. Wilkie,385 the Court considered whether the CAVC may grant 
equitable relief claims under 38 U.S.C. § 503.386 
A.   James Requires the CAVC to Provide More Analysis to Untimely Notice of 
Appeals 
The question presented in James was whether the CAVC applied the 
proper legal standard when reviewing the extraordinary circumstances 
requirement in equitable tolling cases.387 Mr. Charles James placed his 
notice of appeal (NOA) in the mailbox, with the mailbox flag up within 
the 120-day deadline required by statute to appeal a Board decision to 
the CAVC.388 However, for unknown reasons, the NOA did not get 
picked up by United States Postal Service.389 
Under Checo, in order to benefit from equitable tolling, an appellant 
must demonstrate extraordinary circumstances, due diligence, and 
causation.390 The Supreme Court requires a flexible case-by-case 
analysis.391 In James, the Federal Circuit determined that the CAVC 
failed to perform a proper analysis.392 The Federal Circuit found that 
the CAVC’s categorical conclusion that equitable tolling can never 
apply to a case involving a fallen mailbox flag is wrong.393 The Federal 
Circuit found that the CAVC failed to consider whether the fallen 
mailbox flag was due to an alleged third-party interference with the 
federal collection of mail and whether this circumstance could justify 
equitable tolling.394 Additionally, the Federal Circuit found that it was 
irrelevant as to whether Mr. James could have done more to file his 
 
 383. 917 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 384. Id. at 1370. 
 385. 888 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 386. Id. at 1356–58 (rejecting Petitioner’s argument that the CAVC itself can grant 
equitable relief and holding that only the Secretary may do so). 
 387. James, 917 F.3d at 1370 (remanding the case back to the CAVC so the proper 
legal standard could be applied). 
 388. Id. 
 389. Id. 
 390. Id. at 1372–73 (citing Checo v. Shinseki, 748 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). 
 391. Id. at 1373 (pointing out the need for even greater flexibility when 
adjudicating veterans’ claims). 
 392. Id. 
 393. Id. 
 394. Id. at 1374. 
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NOA, in terms of the extraordinary circumstances element.395 On 
remand, the CAVC granted equitable tolling in Mr. James’s case.396 
B.   Federal Circuit Agrees That the CAVC Does Not Have Jurisdiction Under 
38 U.S.C. § 503 to Grant Monetary Relief 
The question presented in Burris is whether the CAVC, itself, has 
jurisdiction to grant equitable relief.397 Burris is a consolidated case of 
Charles Burris and Ben Thompson.398 
Under 38 U.S.C. § 503, the VA Secretary may pay out benefits if there 
is administrative error or a finding that a person detrimentally relied 
upon a determination of the VA, without knowledge that it was 
erroneously made.399 In the Burris case, the appellant’s father was 
granted permanent and total disability, effective October 1, 2000.400 
This grant of benefits entitled Mr. Burris to Dependents Education 
Assistance (“DEA”) benefits.401 In 2010, the appellant requested the 
benefits from 2002 to 2004.402 However, the VA denied the claim 
because the costs were over one year old.403 Under statutes and 
regulations, this was a proper determination by the VA.404 The CAVC 
found that it was without jurisdiction to grant equitable relief.405 
In Ben Thompson’s case, the veteran was entitled to forty-eight 
months of education.406 As of May 2011, he had used forty-four months 
and twenty-two days.407 In July 2011, Thompson received two 
notifications from the VA regarding his education eligibility.408 In the 
first notice, the VA told him he had three months and eight days left 
remaining.409 In the second notice, the VA told him he had thirty-six 
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months of education remaining.410 Relying on the second notice, Mr. 
Thompson transferred the remainder of his eligibility to his son to 
attend a more expensive school than the two he was considering.411 
The VA refused to provide the thirty-six months of benefits and the 
Board affirmed.412 Thompson requested equitable relief from the VA 
Secretary; however, the Secretary denied the request.413 He then 
appealed to the CAVC and the Federal Circuit.414 
The Federal Circuit determined that the CAVC does not have 
authority to outright grant monetary relief to veterans.415 The Federal 
Circuit found that Congress gave the VA Secretary the exclusive 
discretionary authority to provide this relief.416 Sadly for veterans, there 
is no judicial remedy where the VA Secretary refuses equitable relief. 
VIII.    EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT DECISIONS 
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) awards attorney’s fees and expenses to a 
prevailing party in litigation against the United States where the position 
of the United States was not substantially justified.417 This statute is titled 
the Equal Access to Justice Act418 (EAJA). Several decades of case law, 
discussed below, have refined the definition of a “prevailing party” and 
the circumstances under which EAJA fees may be awarded. 
A party does not need to obtain a final judgment in his or her favor 
in order to be a “prevailing party,” according to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. E.E.O.C.419 (CRST), the 
“touchstone of the prevailing party inquiry must be the material 
alteration of the legal relationship of the parties.”420 As a further 
refinement of the “prevailing party” status for EAJA awards, the Federal 
Circuit found that when a case is remanded back to an agency without 
a judicial finding of error or an acknowledgment of error by the 
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agency, there is no prevailing party for EAJA purposes.421 In 2018, the 
Federal Circuit decided two important cases providing further definition to 
the term “prevailing party,” Winters v. Wilkie422 and Robinson v. O’Rourke.423 
A.   Winters v. Wilkie 
The Appellant, Mrs. Regina Winters, substituted herself into her 
husband’s claim for disability compensation when he passed away.424 
The Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied her husband’s underlying 
claims in 2013 and her attorney submitted what may have been 
considered a motion for revision of the Board decision.425 The Board 
did not consider the motion as a request for revision but instead 
referred the issues to the lower agency regional office for review.426 In 
sending the request to the regional office, the Board never informed 
Mrs. Winters that they did not consider her motion a motion for 
review.427 Because the Board failed to provide Mrs. Winters notice of 
this final decision that her letter did not constitute a motion for 
reconsideration, her 120-day window to appeal the Board’s decision to 
the CAVC never began to run.428 
In 2014, the Board denied other claims in Mrs. Winters’s case and 
she appealed both the 2013 and 2014 Board decisions to the CAVC.429 
The CAVC dismissed the 2013 appeal because the court found it did 
not have jurisdiction due to the Board’s failure to issue a final decision 
regarding those claims.430 Finding that the 2013 and 2014 issues were 
inextricably intertwined, the CAVC remanded both sets of claims back 
to the Board for decision.431 
Mrs. Winters’s attorney filed a petition with the CAVC for EAJA fees 
based upon the court’s remand of the issues back to the agency.432 The 
CAVC rejected the petition regarding the 2013 claims because the 
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court did not have jurisdiction over these issues in the first place.433 The 
court then dismissed the petition regarding the 2014 claims finding that 
Mrs. Winters was not a “prevailing party” because the remand of the 2014 
claims was not due to administrative error in the 2014 decision.434 
In her appeal to the Federal Circuit, Mrs. Winters argued that the 
CAVC remand was partially based on the Board’s premature decision 
on the 2014 claims which constituted an error.435 The Federal Circuit 
held that Mrs. Winters failed to meet the burden of demonstrating that 
there was error in the 2014 decision noting that “a boxer thrown out 
of the ring and then allowed back in to continue the fight has not 
prevailed.”436 There is no law requiring the Board to decide the issues 
in any certain order, and Mrs. Winters failed to demonstrate a material 
alteration in the legal relationship of the parties under CRST.437 The 
remand was based solely upon judicial economy and no error on the 
part of the agency was shown.438 
The decision in Winters reinforces the court’s previous decisions that 
remand alone is not enough to warrant EAJA fees. 
B.   Robinson v. O’Rourke 
On appeal to the CAVC, Mr. Bennie Robinson’s counsel, who also 
represented Mr. Robinson at the agency level, argued an issue for the 
first time that ended up in a favorable decision for Mr. Robinson.439 
The CAVC did not apply the doctrine of issue exhaustion and did not 
identify any error on the part of the Board but set aside the Board 
decision and remanded the case so that the Board could address the 
new arguments brought up on appeal.440 Mr. Robinson’s attorney filed 
a petition for EAJA fees arguing that the remand indicated Mr. 
Robinson was a “prevailing party.”441 The CAVC denied the application 
because the remand was not predicated on Board error but upon the 
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new arguments of the attorney.442 The court reiterated that a remand 
alone does not grant prevailing party status.443 
The Federal Circuit noted that the Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in 
CRST did not concern a remand to an agency but instead dealt with 
defendants—not plaintiffs—who prevailed.444 Because of this difference, 
the court commented that it is unclear if reconsideration or clarification of 
previous precedent at the Federal Circuit regarding agency remands will be 
necessary in the future.445 The court found that no decision regarding 
CRST’s impact was necessary in Mr. Robinson’s case because the remand 
was not predicated on agency error and did not result in a material 
alteration of the relationship between the parties.446 The court noted: 
Robinson’s position in this appeal would reward a claimant for 
raising an argument for the first time at the [CAVC]. Such a result 
is illogical and contrary to fundamental principles of orderly 
procedure and good administration. While “[w]e recognize that 
EAJA is an important component of the framework within which 
veterans may seek benefits,” . . . we do not interpret the statute in a 
manner that incentivizes claimants to withhold arguments before 
the Board, or, alternatively, that requires the Board or [CAVC] to 
sua sponte search for and address issues that may be lurking in the 
record but that have not been briefed.447 
In Robinson, the Federal Circuit left open the question of whether 
the precedential holdings regarding remands back to the agency level 
should be reexamined in light of the Supreme Court’s 2016 CRST 
decision. Limiting EAJA fees in decisions remanding cases back to the 
agency due to administrative error could have catastrophic effects on 
veterans and their advocates, particularly because remand is the most 
utilized resolution when the CAVC determines there was agency error.448 
Often, EAJA fees are the only fees attorneys earn in cases representing 
veterans in an environment where twenty-six percent of veterans who file at 
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the CAVC are pro se.449 It will be important to watch the Federal Circuit’s 
consideration and implementation of CRST in the coming years. 
CONCLUSION 
Over the past four years, the Federal Circuit has dramatically 
changed CAVC procedural rules, administrative law principles, and 
overturned decades of case law. Each of the decisions discussed above 
will have a substantial impact on the teaching and practice of veterans 
law, specifically with regard to administrative law principles and 
procedural possibilities. 
Given that the United States is still engaged in its longest war to date, 
the War on Terror currently being waged in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
veterans will continue to benefit from the able assistance of counsel. As 
important, judicial review of VA actions is necessary so that our veterans 
receive all of their earned benefits. In light of the seismic changes 
discussed above, affecting hundreds of thousands of veterans, the need 
for informed and effective counsel to help our nation’s veterans seek 
the disability benefits they have earned is of utmost importance. 
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